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Question $19$ of $20$

${?}^{00}$ Every three years, the Writers Guild of America renegotiates a Minimum Basic Agreement $($MBA$)$ with the Alliance of Motion

Picture and Television Producers $($AMPTP$).$ The MBA includes agreements on basic compensation, salaries, royalties, etc., and ownership of original written material.

${?}_{}^N$ are compensated for digital media work such as web series and online$-$only content. The given payoff matrix contains the

$($Q$)$ strategies and outcomes of each party in the negotiation. They could either compromise $($C$)$ or hold firm $($HF$)$ on their issues. If both parties hold firm, the Writers Guild will go on strike. The first number in each box is the Writers Guild's payoff and the second number is AMPTP's payoff. Assume that strategies are chosen independently and simultaneously.

$\backslash$table$[[,$AMPTP$],[,$Hold firm,Compromise$],[$Writers Guild,Hold firm,$0,0,10,3],[$Compromise$,3,10,5,5]]$

What are the Nash equilibria?

Writers Guild compromises and AMPTP holds firm

Writers Guild holds firm and AMPTP holds firm

Writers Guild compromises and AMPTP compromises

Writers Guild holds firm and AMPTP compromises

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