1. Below we solve, in several steps, for a Nash equilibrium of the following game: Let p E [0, 1] be the probability that player 1 plays T. Let q E [0, 1] be the probabil- ity that player 2 plays L and r E [0, 1] the probability that player 2 plays G. Then a mixed strategy prole is represented by (p, q, r), where q + 'r g 1. (a) Find player 1's best response b1(q, r). (b) Find player 2's best response b2(p). (Hint: For each p E [0, 1], check which pure strategies of player 2 give the highest payoff.) (c) Sketch the two best responses b1(-) and b2(-) in the three-dimensional space whose axes are p, q, and 'r. (d) Using your answer to part (c), nd all Nash equilibria of the game