1. In a zero-sum game the saddle point in a payoff matrix is always the: A....

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1. In a zero-sum game the saddle point in a payoff matrix is always the: A. largest number in its column and the largest number in its row. B. largest number in its column and the smallest number in its row. C. smallest number in its column and the largest number in its row. D. smallest number in its column and the smallest number in its row. 2. Consider the following two-person zero-sum game. The payoff for X is given in the table. X will always play strategy: X1 X2 Y1 1 A. X1 B. X2 C. Y1 D. Y2 E. not enough information given. 3. In a zero-sum game, A. No one ever loses. B. No one ever wins. Y2 6 -3 C. Gains equal losses. D. Half the entries in the pay-off matrix are zero. 4. Considering the following two-person zero-sum game, what percentage of the time should the row player play strategy X2? A. 1/3 B. 2/3 C. 4/9 D. 5/9 A. 1/3 B. 2/3 C. 4/9 D. 5/9 A. 6 B. 7/3 C. 14/3 D. 4/3 X1 X2 5. Considering the following two-person zero-sum game, what percentage of the time should the column player play strategy Y1? ARCAE X1 X2 C. Y1 6 2 X1 X2 Y1 6 2 Y2 6. Considering the following two-person zero-sum game, what is the value of the game to the row player? 3 38 Y1 6 2 Y2 3 8 7. A dominant strategy A. Guarantees a player a higher payoff than the competitor. B. Calls for a contingent course of action. Y2 3 8 Is the best response to any strategy that the other player might select. D. Minimizes the other player's payoff. E. Maximizes the sum of the players' payoffs. 1. In a zero-sum game the saddle point in a payoff matrix is always the: A. largest number in its column and the largest number in its row. B. largest number in its column and the smallest number in its row. C. smallest number in its column and the largest number in its row. D. smallest number in its column and the smallest number in its row. 2. Consider the following two-person zero-sum game. The payoff for X is given in the table. X will always play strategy: X1 X2 Y1 1 A. X1 B. X2 C. Y1 D. Y2 E. not enough information given. 3. In a zero-sum game, A. No one ever loses. B. No one ever wins. Y2 6 -3 C. Gains equal losses. D. Half the entries in the pay-off matrix are zero. 4. Considering the following two-person zero-sum game, what percentage of the time should the row player play strategy X2? A. 1/3 B. 2/3 C. 4/9 D. 5/9 A. 1/3 B. 2/3 C. 4/9 D. 5/9 A. 6 B. 7/3 C. 14/3 D. 4/3 X1 X2 5. Considering the following two-person zero-sum game, what percentage of the time should the column player play strategy Y1? ARCAE X1 X2 C. Y1 6 2 X1 X2 Y1 6 2 Y2 6. Considering the following two-person zero-sum game, what is the value of the game to the row player? 3 38 Y1 6 2 Y2 3 8 7. A dominant strategy A. Guarantees a player a higher payoff than the competitor. B. Calls for a contingent course of action. Y2 3 8 Is the best response to any strategy that the other player might select. D. Minimizes the other player's payoff. E. Maximizes the sum of the players' payoffs.

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