$1$st attempt

Keith and Blake play a simultaneous one$-$shot game given by the following table:

$\backslash$table$[[,$Blake$],[$Left$,$Right$],[$Keith$,$Top,$6\mathrm{.}00,-2\mathrm{.}00,0\mathrm{.}00,-3\mathrm{.}00],[$Bottom$,7\mathrm{.}00,0\mathrm{.}00,-2\mathrm{.}00,9\mathrm{.}00]]$

As there is no unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium, assume that each player plays each of his choices half of the time.

What is the average payoff for Keith?

$($Round to two decimals if necessary.$)$

What is the average payoff for Blake?

$($Round to two decimals if necessary.$)$