1.1 Draw the Bayesian normal form representation of this game. 1.2 Recall that a strategy in a static Bayesian game is a function that specifies an action for each type of a player. Write down all the possible strategies for player i. 1.3 Assume that A plays fight if tA = 1 and cave otherwise. If B is of type 1, what should she do? If she is of type 0, what should she do? 1.4 Is there a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which each player fights if and only if she is of type 1? If so, what is the equilibrium probability of a fight? 1.5 Assume that A never fights. If B is of type 1, what should she do? If she is of type 0, what should she do? 1.6 Is there a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which no player ever fights