1.Part a:: Let((a, b, c),(d, e, f))be the mixed strategy profile where player1 chooses A with probability a, B with probability b, C with probability c; and player 2 chooses D with probability d, E with probability e, and F with probability f. For what values of x(x can be negative or positive) is the strategy profile((0,1/2,1/2),(0,1/2,1/2))a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium?

Part b: Suppose that bothaanda?are distinct pure strategy Nash equilibria of the same normal form game. Is it possible forato Pareto dominatea?? If yes, provide a concrete example. Otherwise, explain why not.

der the following normal form game: D E F A 1,1 1. 0 1. 0 C | 0,1 0,T f) ) be the mixed strategy profile where player 1 choose b, C with probability c; and player 2 chooses D with p ith probability f. For what values of r (r can be negat 2, 1/2), (0, 1/2, 1/2)) a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium se that both a and a' are distinct pure strategy Nash