Question: 2. (20 points) Consider the game below. Player 1's pure strategies are A, B and C. Player 2's pure strategies are L, C, R L

 2. (20 points) Consider the game below. Player 1's pure strategies

2. (20 points) Consider the game below. Player 1's pure strategies are A, B and C. Player 2's pure strategies are L, C, R L R A 0.0 2, -2 -2.3 B -2, 2 0,0 2. -1 3. 1 -1, 2 0, 1 (a) Find whether there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (M.S.N.E) where player 1 mixes between A and C and player 2 mixes between L, C and R with positive probability. (10 points) (b) Does there exist a MSNE where each player chooses each of her strategies with strictly positive probability. (10 points)

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