2. A J'JIIE output is L(1DD L} when it uses L S 50 units of labor, and 2500 when it uses L I} 50 units of labor. The price of output is 1. A union that represents workers presents a wage demand [a nonnegative number to], which the Imeither accepts or rejects. If the rm accepts the demand, it chooses the number L of workers to employ (which you should take to be a continuous variable, not an integer); if it rejects the demand, no production takes place [L = {I}. The rms preferences are represented by its prot; the unions preferences are represented by the value of 1:113. a. Formulate this situation as an extensive game with perfect information. b. Find the subgame perfect equilibrium [equilibria?) of the game. c. Is there an outcome of the game that both parties prefer to any subgame perfect equilibrium outcome? d. Find a Nash equilibrium for which the outcome differs from any subgame perfect equilib- rium out come