2. Consider the following normal form game: (a) (b) a b c Find at least three NE for the static game and calculate the corresponding NE payoffs for both players. Suppose that the above described stage- game is played twice (the players observe each others action choices for the rst round before the second round). A player's payoff is the undiscounted sum of the payoffs form both rounds. Is this a game of perfect information? (No need to draw the game tree). Consider the twiceplayed game. Construct some SPE strategies such that (C, c) is played in the rst stage. What are the expected payoffs in that equlibrium? Compare with part (a). (Hint. Use a bad stage NE as the ipunishment' and a good NE as the 'reward'.) 3. Consider again the same stage game as in Question 2. Now, assume that the game is played infinitely many times. (a) Construct a trigger strategy profile where (C, c) is always played on the equilibrium path. (There is not only one right answer: you can choose the punishment many different ways. ) (b) For the trigger strategy profile in part (a), find the smallest dis- count factor such that the profile gives a SPE. (Remember to argue both on path and off path.)