$2-$ Two distinct proposal, A and B$,$ are being debated in Ottawa. Parliament likes proposal A$,$

and the Governor General likes proposal B$.$ The proposals are not mutually exclusive; either

or both or neither may become law. Thus, there are four possible outcomes, and they are

ranked by the two sides are as follows, where a larger number represents a

First, Parliament decides whether to pass a bill and whether the bill is to contain A or B or

both. Then, the Governor General decides whether to sign or veto the bill.

a$)$ Show this game in the normal form of this game. Find all pure$-$strategy Nash Equilibria

$($if any$)$

b$)$ Draw the extensive form of this game.

c$)$ Find the Nash equilibrium. $[$Hint: clearly write strategy profile for each player at the

equilibrium.$]$

d$)$ Now suppose the rules of the game are changed in only one respect: the Governor

General is given the extra power of a line$-$item veto. Thus, if Parliament passes a bill

containing both A and B$,$ the Governor General may choose not only to sign or veto the

bill as a whole, but also to veto just one of the two items. Show the new extensive form

and find the equilibrium.

e$)$ Explain intuitively why the difference between the two equilibria arises.

please gives an proper details