3. (Game Theory - 15 pts) Consider a game with the following reward table: Player 2 Player 1 (a) (2pts) Solve for any Pure Nash Equilibrium using iterative deletion? (b) (2pts) Are there any other Pure Nash Equilibrium? If so, what is it? Why was it missed? (c) (4pts) Assume Player 1 never selects C (only A and B). Is there a. mixed strategy that results in an equilibrium if Player 1 uses A and B randomly? (d) (4pts) Assume Player 1 never selects C (only A and B). Does Player 2 have a mixed strategy? (e) (3pts) Combine all your ndings to state all pure and mixed Nash Equilibrium along with the expected rewards for each player. (f) (Extra Credit 4pts. No Partial Credit) Consider the partially described game below with undened rewards r1, 1'2, 1'3, and T4 for Player 2. Assuming Player 1 has a. mixed strategy, solve for p and 1 p in terms of r1, r2, r3, and 1'4. Based on the resulting equation, describe the constraints on 1'1, 1'2, 1'3, and n; so that 0 0. HOW does your answer change if r1 r2