3, (Simultaneous Game) Find all and all Nash equilibria profile for the games below.

a.

Player 2

	L	M	N	O
A	2, 2	0, 4	4, 0	3, 3
B	3, 1	1, 3	2, 2	4, 0
C	0, 4	2, 2	3, 1	1, 3
D	4, 0	3, 3	1, 3	2, 2

Player 1 are abcd there was no space to write it on the left side

b.

Van Pelt

	North	South	East	West
Earth	1, 3	3, 1	0, 2	1, 1
Water	1, 2	1, 2	2, 3	1, 1
Wind	3, 2	2, 1	1, 3	0, 3
Fire	2, 0	3, 0	1, 1	2, 2

Sam Parrish

c.

Player 2

	L	M	N	O	P	Q
A	2, 2	1, 1	1, 0	0, 0	0, 1	0, 2
B	1, 1	3, 3	1, 1	0, 2	2, 2	0, 1
C	0, 1	1, 1	2, 2	1, 0	1, 1	0, 0
D	0, 0	0, 2	1, 0	1, 1	1, 0	2, 2
E	1, 0	2, 2	1, 1	0, 1	3, 3	1, 1
F	2, 0	0, 1	0, 0	2, 2	1, 1	2, 2

Player 1

d.

Player 2

	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S
A	3, 3	1, 0	1, 0	0, 0	1, 1	0, 1	0, 2	2, 2
B	2, 2	0, 0	1, 1	0, 1	0, 1	1, 0	2, 2	0, 2
C	1, 1	2, 2	0, 0	1, 1	0, 2	2, 2	1, 0	0, 1
D	0, 0	1, 1	2, 2	0, 0	2, 2	1, 1	0, 1	1, 0
E	1, 1	0, 1	2, 2	1, 0	3, 3	1, 2	1, 0	0, 0
F	0, 2	1, 0	1, 2	2, 2	1, 1	3, 3	0, 0	1, 1
G	2, 2	2, 2	0, 1	1, 1	0, 1	0, 0	3, 3	1, 0
H	1, 0	0, 0	1, 0	2, 2	1, 0	1, 1	0, 1	3, 3

Player 1

4, (Monopoly and Cournot competition) The market demand for office paper is P = 400 2Q.

Suppose that there is only one firm in the market, and it has a unit cost and marginal cost of $40. Calculate the monopolist's:

1. profit maximizing quantity
2. price
3. profit

b, Now, suppose that two companies supply office paper, Dunder Mifflin Paper Companyand Michael Scott Paper Company. Each firm has a marginal cost and a unit cost of production that equals to $40. These companies maximize their profits and compete in the market in quantities. Companies can choose any quantity to supply, and they make their quantity choices simultaneously.

i, Derive the best response function of each firm and illustrate both functions in a single graph.

ii, How much does each firm sell in a Cournot equilibrium? iii.What is the market price? iv.What are the firms' profits?

v.Why isn't producing half the monopoly output a Nash equilibrium?