3. Using your questions and graph, answer the following questions: a) What is the highest interest rate a SAFE farmer would be willing to pay for a loan 'om Daniel? b) What is the highest interest rate a RISKY farmer would be willing to pqy for a loan 'om Daniel? c) What is the lowest interest rate Daniel would be willing to charge on a loan to a SAFE farmer? d) What is the lowest interest rate Daniel would be willing to charge on a loan to a RISKY farmer? 4. First, assume that the loan market is perfectly competitive. There are many other lenders who would charge a lower interest than Daniel if Daniel was making a prot. a) What is the equilibrium interest rate Daniel would charge a SAFE farmer? b) What is the equilibrium interest rate Daniel would charge a RISKY farmer? c) What is Daniel's total expected prot E{H) = Ers) + E(JIR)'.' d) What is total expected income across all types of famers E(Y) = E(Y3) + E0710? 5. Now, assume that all the other lenders le Pokeville, and now Daniel is a monopolist moneylender. a) What is the equilibrium interest rate Daniel would charge a SAFE farmer? b) What is the equilibrium interest rate Daniel would charge a RISKY farmer? c) What is Daniel's total expected prot E0!) = Ers) + E(JIR)'.' d) What is total expected income across all types of famers E(Y) = E(Yg) + ECHO