(3.45 Points) Given the payoff table above which provides the company profits in each scenario, what is the optimal secure decision for each company for each of the following scenarios. Type the correct answer in the box after each question If Company A advertises, then what should Company B do? Type Advertise or Don't Advertise in the box here If Company A does not advertise, then what should Company B do? Type Advertise or Don't Advertise in the box here If Company B advertises, then what should Company A do? Type Advertise or Don't Advertise in the box here e If Company B does not advertise, then what should Company A do? Type Advertise or Don't Advertise in the box here Is a Nash Equilibrium present? If so, what is the amount of adverstising for Company A and for (3.45 Points) Given the payoff table above which provides the company profits in each scenario, what is the optimal secure decision for each company for each of the following scenarios. Type the correct answer in the box after each question If Company A advertises, then what should Company B do? Type Advertise or Don't Advertise in the box here If Company A does not advertise, then what should Company B do? Type Advertise or Don't Advertise in the box here If Company B advertises, then what should Company A do? Type Advertise or Don't Advertise in the box here e If Company B does not advertise, then what should Company A do? Type Advertise or Don't Advertise in the box here Is a Nash Equilibrium present? If so, what is the amount of adverstising for Company A and for