(3h) How much does each supplier earn under the BertrandNash Equilibrium in (2g) (accounting for the investment cost)? Are payoffs lower or higher in this equilibrium than in the other two Bertrand-Nash equilibria (considered above)? Consider the following twostage game. 1. First, each supplier simultaneously and independently decides whether to invest in the new technology at a cost of $500. 2. Second, with each supplier having made hisfher investment decision (revealed to each other), each supplier simultaneously and independently decides on the price to charge for his/her product. So the second stage of this game is the Bertrand game, conditional on each supplier's first stage investment decision. This two-stage game can be solved using backward induction first solve the second stage game for each possible outcome of the rst stage and then solve the rst stage. You've actually done the first step of the induction in the earlier parts of this question (3i) Fill-in the following payoff matrix for the rst-stage "investment game" using your answers from (2d), (2f), (2h) Sar ddddd...dd Joe Notlnvest HINT: The payoffs from the Nash-Bertrand Equilibrium where Sarah invests but Joe does not are symmetric to the case where Joe invests but Sarah does not. (3j) Solve for the pure strategy Nash equilibrium for this "investment game." (3k) Explain why this "investment game" is a "Prisoner's Dilemma" game. Who benefits the most from the availability of this new low cost technology: Joe, Sarah, or consumers? (4) Solving for Nash Equilibria Consider the following two-player game represented in normal form. Each player has four possible pure strategies | PLAYER 2 L M N O