4. [10 points total] Consider two bidders with private values, where 1:,- EE U [[1, 300]. Under this distributional assumption, I Pra 5 1:] = Pr{rr; s'.' I} 300 E[highest pi] = 2m] E[2nd highest pi] = 100 Conditional payoffs are: win ut- = e;- {amount paid} em = e (a) [2 points] 1What is the expected revenue in a secondprice {Viekrey} auction's Nash equilibrium? {1]} [4 points] Now consider a rstprice auction. Suppose that bidder 2 will bid the square root of her valuation: b; = g. What is bidder 1's expected payoffmaximizing bidding strategy, 51(1'1}? {Hint you rival}:r nd it useful to recall that if f(3] = usa, then His) = Susi.) {e} [4 points] \"mat is the expected revenue in a rst-price auction's Nash equi- librium? [Note: if you want to use the exact form of the equilibrium bids to answer this question, then you must prove that the behavior you posit is indeed an equilibrium.)