4. Adverse selection (12 pts]: Consider Table 101, which has data on insurance status and medical expenditures for different types of professors at Adverse Selection University (MU). In 2014, every employee of ASU was offered a full insurance contract at no premium. In 2015, ASU charged any employee who wanted to keep health insurance a $4,000 premium. As a result, all history professors dropped their coverage in 2015. Assume that the underlying health of ASU professors did not change much from year to year. Table 10.1: Information from the human resources department at ASU. mm 2015 [nous-ed? Average Inward? Average Elpellditmu Expand Hum Economies Professors Yes $5,000 Yes 535,000 History Professors Yes $3,111.10 No 52.0% a. Is there evidence of moral hazard in this market? How do you know? b. Is there evidence of adverse selection in this market? Howr do you know? c, Explain how moral hazard and adverse selection, working together, will affect the expected costs of the insurer in this market. d. What premium will the insurer likely charge in 2016 ($4000, $5000, $6000]? Who will buy insurance