Question: 4. Consider the following extensive form game. Specify all the pure strategy subgame per- fect equilibria (SPE), weak perfect Bayesian equilibria (WPBE) and sequential equi-

 4. Consider the following extensive form game. Specify all the pure

strategy subgame per- fect equilibria (SPE), weak perfect Bayesian equilibria (WPBE) and

4. Consider the following extensive form game. Specify all the pure strategy subgame per- fect equilibria (SPE), weak perfect Bayesian equilibria (WPBE) and sequential equi- libria (SE). (For WPBE and SE, you need to specify both the strategy profile and the beliefs, in this case, player 3's belief. You also need to verify sequential rationality and (weak) consistency.) b 2 C 3 (1, 1, 1) e e f (3, 3, 2) (0, 0, 0) (4, 4, 0) (0, 0, 1)

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