Question: 8. In the game shown, player 1 learns his type and sends a message, and then both players 1 and 2 simultaneously choose actions.

8. In the game shown, player 1 learns his type and sends

8. In the game shown, player 1 learns his type and sends a message, and then both players 1 and 2 simultaneously choose actions. Find a separating per- fect Bayes-Nash equilibrium. 1 W 2 a Type s Probability = 1 1 b Nature Type t Probability = 23 a W W W y Z y Z y Z y Z y Z y Z y Z y Z Player 1 3 2 1 3 2 1 1 4 1 Player 2 0 2 3 1 O 2 3 1 1 4 1 4

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