$9)$

Now suppose the bribe decision is sequential instead: Vunion must first decide whether to bribe the Regulator, and then Wunion observes the outcome and decides second whether to bribe the Regulator. What will be the outcome in this sequential version of the game?

$$

$$

Now disregard everything above and suppose the distributor payoffs are instead given by the following matrix:

High

Vunion

Medium

Low

Wunion

Expensive

Cheap

$10$

$5$

$2$

$20$

$4$

$2$

$5$

$8$

$3$

$11$

$9$

$4$

$)$

If these given values all represented dollars instead of utility payoffs, with both firms having $1$:$1$ utility over money and transfers of payoffs fully allowed, then what sets$)$ of actions would they want to choose for collusion, if any?

s$)$

Now instead assume the payoff values in this matrix represent non$-$transferrable utility outcomes specific to each player. What is the minimum possible discount factor, if any are possible, that could sustain this collusion in an infinitely repeated version of this simultaneous game?

t$)$

Briefly $($subjectively$)$ comment on which distributor is more patient regarding its stream of payoffs and what factors might affect this, such as ownership and compensation structure of the firm.

u$)$

Suppose there was only one monopolist brewery in the US with the same production characteristics and cost structure as BLB but unlimited production capacity with no effects of economies of scale: this monopolist brewer can scale up infinitely with the same fixed cost, variable costs, etc... basically cloning itself across the country but with one owner. Suppose the national equilibrium market price that the thousands of competing retailers pay to US distributors for lagers is $$17,$ and these US retailers can easily buy from international distributors at the same price without additional costs or restrictions. If there were numerous competing US distributors who could only buy from the monopolist brewer, what price would the monopolist brewer charge for its lagers? $($You can answer this subjectively if you are not confident in your calculations from the relevant prior parts.$)$