Q1. Suppose player A and player B are playing the following game. Player A can choose "Up" and "Down", while player B can choose "Left" and "Right". The payoff matrix is depicted below. Player A's payoff is the first entry. Player B's payoff is the second entry. Player A U D Run Player B L (-25,-4) (7,5) (1, 1) a. Suppose this is a one-shot, simultaneously-move game, find all the Nash equilibria (pure and mixed). Q2. Consider this sequential game. Assume the players can only use pure strategies Player 1 Drive Fly A Player 2 Walk Run R (1.1) (4, 10) Walk Swim (10, 0) (3,20) (2,10) (1,9) a. Use backward induction to solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.