A pay$-$as$-$you$-$go social security system cannot be a market equilibrium because

A$.$ It is not Pareto optimal.

B$.$ It is not possible for the current working$-$age generation to strike a deal the generation not yet born.

C$.$ Asymmetric information reduces the return to social security.

D$.$ A majority of voters would vote against it$.$

Pay$-$as$-$you$-$go social security

A$.$ can never improve economic welfare for everyone.

B$.$ can improve welfare for everyone if the population growth rate exc market rate of return.

C$.$ is always better than a fully funded system.

D$.$ is not used by any countries in the world.

The observed decline in fertility rates and population growth in man countries implies that a pay$-$as$-$you$-$go system like Social Security

A$.$ more likely to be Pareto optimal and meet its obligations to fut

B$.$ less likely to be Pareto optimal and meet its obligations to futu

C$.$ more likely to be Pareto optimal but less likely to meet its ob retirees.

D$.$ less likely to be Pareto optimal but more likely to meet its $0$ retires.