5. Consider the following game: P1 Out (2,4) U A (3,2) R P2 Al F (0,3)...

 

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5. Consider the following game: P1 Out (2,4) U A (3,2) R P2 Al F (0,3) (4,2) (1,1) a. Identify all NE (throughout #3 you are only required to provide pure strategy equilibria). b. Identify all (SPE) subgame perfect NE, if any. c. Identify all (NFTHPE) normal form trembling hand perfect NE, if any. d. Identify all (WPBE) weak perfect Bayesian NE, if any. e. Identify the (SE) sequential NE, if any. For part f below, consider the same game but now Pl has two information sets. At the first he decides to play "Out" or "In". If he plays "Out" the game ends immediately and the payoffs are (2,4). If he plays "In", then he immediately reaches his 2nd information set, where he must choose to play R or U, with continued play as in the extensive form game above. f. Repeat parts a-e for the new extensive form game. 5. Consider the following game: P1 Out (2,4) U A (3,2) R P2 Al F (0,3) (4,2) (1,1) a. Identify all NE (throughout #3 you are only required to provide pure strategy equilibria). b. Identify all (SPE) subgame perfect NE, if any. c. Identify all (NFTHPE) normal form trembling hand perfect NE, if any. d. Identify all (WPBE) weak perfect Bayesian NE, if any. e. Identify the (SE) sequential NE, if any. For part f below, consider the same game but now Pl has two information sets. At the first he decides to play "Out" or "In". If he plays "Out" the game ends immediately and the payoffs are (2,4). If he plays "In", then he immediately reaches his 2nd information set, where he must choose to play R or U, with continued play as in the extensive form game above. f. Repeat parts a-e for the new extensive form game.

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a The pure strategy Nash equilibria NE are Out any action for player 1 and 2 4 for player 2 R U for ... View the full answer