After reading the Case below answer the following questions:

1. Do you or someone agree that the girls had taken a substantial step toward the commission of a targeted offense?

2. What test does the court establish for Tennessee to determine if a substantial step has been taken?

3. Would your or someone's answer be different if Tennessee used the last-step test or the physical proximity test? If so, how?

4. Do you or someone think that the court, in using common law rules of construction, modifies the legislative enactment?

5. Is the court using its judgment to replace that of the drafters of the statute?

Is It Attempted Murder for Students to Bring Poison to School with the Intent of Killing a Teacher? Read the Court's full opinion at: https://crimlaw.justiceprograms.com

Tennessee v. Reeves, 917 S.W.2d 825 (Tenn. 1996)

The Case On the evening of January 5, 1993, Tracie Reeves and Molly Coffman, both 12 years of age and students at West Carroll Middle School, spoke on the telephone and decided to kill their homeroom teacher, Janice Geiger. The girls agreed that Coffman would bring rat poison to school the following day so that it could be placed in Geiger's drink. The girls also agreed that they would thereafter steal Geiger's car and drive to the Smoky Mountains. Reeves then contacted Dean Foutch, a local high school student, informed him of the plan, and asked him to drive Geiger's car. Foutch refused this request.

On the morning of January 6, Coffman placed a packet of rat poison in her purse and boarded the school bus. During the bus ride Coffman told another student, Christy Hernandez, of the plan; Coffman also showed Hernandez the packet of rat poison. Upon their arrival at school, Hernandez informed her homeroom teacher, Sherry Cockrill, of the plan. Cockrill then relayed this information to the principal of the school, Claudia Argo.

When Geiger entered her classroom that morning she observed Reeves and Coffman leaning over her desk; when the girls noticed her, they giggled and ran back to their seats. At that time Geiger saw a purse lying next to her coffee cup on top of the desk. Shortly thereafter, Argo called Coffman to the principal's office. Rat poison was found in Coffman's purse, and it was turned over to a Sheriff's Department investigator. Both Reeves and Coffman gave written statements to the investigator concerning their plan to poison Geiger and steal her car.

Reeves and Coffman were found to be delinquent by the Carroll County Juvenile Court [and a jury convicted them of attempt to commit second-degree murder] and both appealed from that ruling....Because we have not addressed the law of criminal attempt since the comprehensive reform of our criminal law undertaken by the legislature in 1989, we granted that application.

The Finding Before the passage of the reform legislation in 1989, the law of criminal attempt, though sanctioned by various statutes, was judicially defined. In order to submit an issue of criminal attempt to the jury, the State was required to present legally sufficient evidence of: (1) an intent to commit a specific crime; (2) an overt act toward the commission of that crime; and (3) a failure to consummate the crime.

Of the elements of criminal attempt, the second, the "overt-act" requirement, was by far the most problematic. By attempting to draw a sharp distinction between "mere preparation" to commit a criminal act, which did not constitute the required overt act, and a "direct movement toward the commission after the preparations had been made," Dupuy, 325 S.W.2d at 239, 240, which did, Tennessee courts construed the term "overt act" very narrowly....

In 1989, however, the legislature enacted a general criminal attempt statute, as part of its comprehensive overhaul of Tennessee's criminal law. In that statute, the legislature did not simply codify the judicially created elements of the crime, but utilized language that had up to then been entirely foreign to Tennessee attempt law. Section 39-12-101 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

A person commits criminal attempt who, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the offense:

Intentionally engages in action or causes a result that would constitute an offense if the circumstances surrounding the conduct were as the person believes them to be;

Acts with intent to cause a result that is an element of the offense, and believes the conduct will cause the result without further conduct on the person's part; or

Acts with intent to complete a course of action or cause a result that would constitute the offense, under the circumstances surrounding the conduct as the person believes them to be, and the conduct constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of the offense.

Conduct does not constitute a substantial step under subdivision (a)(3) unless the person's entire course of action is corroborative of the intent to commit the offense....

As stated above, our task is to determine whether the defendant's actions in this case constitute a "substantial step" toward the commission of second-degree murder under the new statute....

In addressing this issue, we first note that the legislature, in enacting Section(s) 39-12-101, clearly looked to the criminal attempt section set forth in the Model Penal Code....

The State argues that the striking similarity of Tenn. Code Ann. 39-12-101 and the Model Penal Code evidences the legislature's intention to abandon the old law of criminal attempt and instead adopt the Model Penal Code approach. The State then avers that the model code contains examples of conduct which, if proven, would entitle, but not require, the jury to find that the defendant had taken a "substantial step" and that two of these examples are applicable to this case. The section of the model code relied upon by the State, Section(s) 5.01(2), provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

Conduct which may be held a substantial step under paragraph (1)(c). Conduct shall not be held to constitute a substantial step under paragraph (1)(c) of this Section unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose. Without negating the sufficiency of other conduct, the following, if strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose, shall not be held insufficient as a matter of law....

e.possession of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, which are specially designed for such unlawful use or which can serve no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances;

f.possession, collection, or fabrication of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, at or near the place contemplated for its commission, where such possession, collection, or fabrication serves no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances....

The State concludes that because the issue of whether the defendant's conduct constitutes a substantial step may be a jury question under the model code, the jury was justified in finding her guilty of attempting to commit second-degree murder....

Initially, we cannot accept the argument that the legislature intended to explicitly adopt the Model Penal Code approach, including the examples set forth in Section(s) 5.01(2). Although Section(s) 39-12-101 is obviously based on the model code, we agree with the defendant that the legislature could have, if it had so desired, simply included the specific examples in the Tennessee statute. That it did not do so prohibits us from concluding that the legislature explicitly intended to adopt the model code approach in all its particulars.

This conclusion does not mean, however, that the legislature intended to retain the distinction between "mere preparation" and the "act itself." Moreover, while we concede that a strong argument can be made that the conviction conflicts with Dupuy because the defendant did not place the poison in the cup, but simply brought it to the crime scene, we also are well aware that the Dupuy approach to attempt law has been consistently and effectively criticized....The other principal ground of criticism of the Dupuy approach bears directly on the primary objective of the lawthat of preventing inchoate crimes from becoming full-blown ones. Many courts and commentators have argued that failing to attach criminal responsibility to the actorand therefore prohibiting law enforcement officers from taking actionuntil the actor is on the brink of consummating the crime endangers the public and undermines the preventative goal of attempt law.

The shortcomings of the Dupuy rule with respect to the goal of prevention are particularly evident in this case. As stated above, it is likely that under Dupuy no criminal responsibility would have attached unless the poison had actually been placed in the teacher's cup. This rigid requirement, however, severely undercuts the objective of prevention because of the surreptitious nature of the act of poisoning. Once a person secretly places a toxic substance into a container from which another person is likely to eat or drink, the damage is done. Here, if it had not been for the intervention of the teacher, she could have been rendered powerless to protect herself from harm.

After carefully weighing considerations of stare decisis against the persuasive criticisms of the Dupuy rule, we conclude that this artificial and potentially harmful rule must be abandoned. We hold that when an actor possesses materials to be used in the commission of a crime, at or near the scene of the crime, and where the possession of those materials can serve no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances, the jury is entitled, but not required, to find that the actor has taken a "substantial step" toward the commission of the crime if such action is strongly corroborative of the actor's overall criminal purpose. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed....