Aktas and McDaniel $(2009)$ prove that the Capital Asset Pricing Model $($CAPM$)$ fails to most accurately estimate true cost of capital: the study found $925$ out of $8361$ companies to have a negative beta $($when CAPM$-$generated costs of equity are less than zero$)--$meaning about $11$ percent of companies calculated in Applied Financial Economics' "Pragmatic problems in using beta..." produced a negative cost of equity$[1].$ Unless a stock is a "safe haven" such as a government bond, negative cost of equity should be more rare as stock does not normally $1)$ have such low market sensitivity$,$ or $2)$ move so inversely to the market $($aka$,$ it should not rise when market descends, but should descend along with the rest of the market$)[2].$ CAPM is not a super$-$functional model for systemic$/$deep$/$large scale economic crises such as the recent Global Financial Crisis and other crises such as the COVID$-19$ pandemic, but one widely acceptably used to quickly predict a basic market volatility factor when comparing trading portfolios$[3].*$CAPM fails to capture risk premiums investors may demand during periods of uncertainty because CAPM assumes a constant market risk premium while perceived risks would drive up costs of equity; our text suggests others such as the Arbitrage Pricing Theory $($APT$)$ which can include more than one single factor in CAPM$[4].$ This leads to our final response, that CAPM can be assumed to have not performed well $($accurately$)$ during the most recent inflation shock $(2020-$present$),$ because it fails to capture inflationary risk$[5].$ Other models would be more useful during times of market volatility or experienced factors of shock.