All help is appreciated for this question.

1. Simple 2-player game: (a) (1 point) What are the possible payoffs if Player 1 chooses U? _ and (b) (2 points) If Player 1 believes that Player 2 will choose L with a probability q and R with a probability 1 q, what is Player 1's expected payoff by choosing U? (c) (1 point) What are the possible payoffs if Player 1 chooses D? _ and (d) (2 points) If Player 1 believes that Player 2 will choose L with a probability q and R with a probability 1 q, what is Player 1's expected payoff by choosing D? (e) (2 points) Under what condition would Player 1 be willing to play a mixed strategy in equilibrium (mixing the two pure strategies U and D)? (f) (2 points) Compute the equilibrium q* that supports Player 1 to play a mixed strategy in Nash equilibrium