An object that two people value at an integer value, v > 0, is sold in an auction. In the auction, the people take turns bidding; a bid must be a positive integer greater than the previous bid. (In the situation that gives the game its name, v is 100 cents.) On her turn, a player may pass rather than bid, in which case the game ends and the other player receives the object; both players pay their last bid (if any). (For example, if player 1 initially passes, player 2 receives the object at no cost; if player 1 bids 1, player 2 bids 3, and then player 1 passes, player 2 obtains the object, but player 1 pays 1 and player 2 pays 3.) Each person's wealth is w > v and players may not bid more than their wealth. 3 Model the auction as an extensive game with v = 2 and w = 3. Find its (pure- strategy) subgame perfect Nash Equilibria. Think about how one would solve this game for arbitrary values of v and w (but do not attempt to solve it unless you want to!)