Question: ANN C BOB C ( 1 , 1 , 1 ) D d CHRIS - R R ( 3 , 3, 2 ) (0, 0,

 ANN C BOB C ( 1 , 1 , 1 )

ANN C BOB C ( 1 , 1 , 1 ) D d CHRIS - R R ( 3 , 3, 2 ) (0, 0, 0 ) ( 4.4, 0 ) (0,0, 1) Think of Ann as player 1, Bob as player 2, and Chris as player 3. . Provide a complete description of this dynamic game using the more abstract notation seen in class: N, T, Z, ... . What are the pure Nash equilibria? . What are the subgames? . What are the pure subgame perfect equilibria? . Is there an equilibrium in which all players randomize? Explain

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