Answer the following questions, which one is correct

Consider a strategic business environment in which eBay and Amazon must simultaneously decide whether to heavily discount (D) a product or not (N). The payoffs are as follows. If both rms opt for D, each gets a prot of $50 million. If both opt for N, eBay gets $100 million and Amazon $100 million. If eBay opts for D and Amazon opts for N, eBay gets $150 million and Amazon $a million. If eBay chooses N and Amazon chooses D, the payoffs are $20 million and $150 million to eBay and Amazon, respectively. For the game to have more than one Nash equilibrium, 0 must be: It is not possible to determine without further information. equal to 50 smaller than 50 between 50 and 100 between 100 and 150 If each player in a game has a strictly dominant strategy, then: each player achieves a maximum payoff in equilibrium. @ the game can only played once. the game has no equilibrium. there cannot be multiple equilibria. the Nash equilibrium is welfaremaximising. D Question 20 1 pts CSL, a healthcare company trying to invent the vaccine for the Covid-19 virus, can choose to invest Big (B) or Small (S). A rival company, Pfizer, observed this choice and can then choose to Compete (C) or Not (N). The payoffs following B and C are (10, 10) to CSL and Pfizer, respectively. After choices B and N the payoffs are (15, 20) to the pair. If the actions are S then C, the payoffs are (40, 10) to CSL and Pfizer respectively. If CSL opted for S and Pfizer N, the payoffs are 20 each. Which of the following statements is/are true? The choice of N by Pfizer following S by CSL is credible O The choice of C by Pfizer following CSL's choice of S is credible. Both choices C and N by Pfizer can be credible depending on what CSL chooses. The choice of N by Pfizer following B by CSL is not credible. The choice of C by Pfizer following CSL's choice of B is not credible. D Question 24 1 pts CSL, a healthcare company trying to invent the vaccine for the Covid-19 virus, can choose to invest Big (B) or Small (S). A rival company, Pfizer, observed this choice and can then choose to Compete (C) or Not (N). The payoffs following B and C are (20, 40) to CSL and Pfizer, respectively. After choices B and N the payoffs are (10, 10) to the pair. If the actions are S then C, the payoffs are 15 each. If CSL opted for S and Pfizer N, the payoffs are (a, 20). For (B, C) to be the credible equilibrium of the game, it must be that: O a s 40 O a z 20 O a > 10 O a 15 D Question 11 1 pts Baby Bunting chooses to whether Open (O) a new store or Not (N) in Alexandria where one of its rival-Baby Kingdom's stores is located. If Baby Bunting opts for N, the payoff to Baby Bunting is 10 and Baby Kingdom gets 20. If Baby Bunting chooses to Open, Baby Kingdom then can choose to Fight (F) or Accommodate (A). If Baby Kingdom chooses F, following Baby Bunting's choice to Open, the payoff is (5, 5) to Baby Bunting and Baby Kingdom, respectively. If Baby Bunting chooses to Open, then Baby Kingdom opts for A payoffs are (15, 15). Which of the following statements are true? O (N, F) is a non-credible Nash equilibrium O (O, A) is a credible (subgame perfect) equilibrium O (O, A) and (N, F) are two credible (subgame perfect) equilibria. (O, A) and (N, F) are two Nash equilibria O (O, A) is a non-credible Nash equilibrium