Question: ANSWER THE QUESTIONS FOR CHAPTER 7 AND 8 CHAPTER 7 and 8 READING BELOW. No less than 7-10 lines long for chapter assigned; CHAPTER must
ANSWER THE QUESTIONS FOR CHAPTER 7 AND 8
CHAPTER 7 and 8 READING BELOW. No less than 7-10 lines long for chapter assigned; CHAPTER must be discussed. Required readings MUST BE used AND referred/INCLUDED IN THE ANSWERS to the source
Chapter 7
If selective incapacitation and gross incapacitation do not reduce serious crimes, what actions can be taken to decrease such crimes? Is it necessarily CJ factors and answers that can help? Are there other social institutions that can impact the crime rate? How so?
While the text provides some examples, a fundamental question should surround how incarcerations impact families and communities. Discussion should encompass personal responsibilities and economics.
Chapter 8
Determine if there are special courts that handle certain cases (i.e., drug, domestic violence, mental health, etc) locally. Determine if specialty units, even when faced with the evidence in the text, can provide more for the victim and/or offender and provide support for their stance.
Debate the use of mental institutions or prisons/jails as confinement facilities for those who have mental health issues. Where do students believe those persons should carry out their criminal sentence? Why?
As both banning plea bargains and reforming plea negotiations result in speed and efficiency of cases, which option is more fiscally responsible? Support should be provided.
Given the finality of the death penalty, should those persons on death row be allowed to exhaust all possible appeals or should they be limited in the number of appeals to file? support your opinion (e.g., economics, time and effort of the courts, attempt to decrease frivolousness, the majority are guilty - factually and legally, etc). If applicable, determine the state's stance on death row appeals.
Chapter 7
Lock 'Em Up
Learning Objectives
GETTING CRIMINALS OFF THE STREET
Identify incarceration proposals as liberal or conservative
List the incarceration strategies noted in the chapter
Describe the events leading up to the two bail reform movements as well as the backlash resulting from them
Compare and contrast the impact of the Washington D.C. preventive detention law with the Federal Bail Reform Act
Defend the argument that defendants out on bail are not a danger to society
Explain the role the prediction problem plays in preventive detention by discussing pretrial drug testing and the natural experiment
Appraise the argument that speedy trial is a good way to reduce both crime on bail and FTAs
THE PHILOSOPHY OF INCAPACITATION
Define incapacitation and differentiate it from other goals of punishment
Define and differentiate between the selective and gross incapacitation
Explain the process used by Zedlewski to reach his conclusion that incarceration saves money
Critique Zedlewski's findings regarding the cost savings from incarceration
Identify the various costs of overimprisonment
MANDATORY SENTENCING
Define mandatory sentencing and provide specific examples of it
"THE NATION'S TOUGHEST DRUG LAW"
Describe the Rockefeller Drug Law and its purpose
Discuss the immediate and long term impact of the law
Explain how mandatory sentencing laws are affected by the criminal justice law of thermodynamics
THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Describe the impact of Federal Sentencing Guidelines and mandatory sentencing
THREE STRIKESWE ARE ALL OUT
Summarize three-strikes sentencing laws and their related variations
Discuss the extent with which states use their three-strikes sentencing laws
Defend the argument that three-strikes laws are ineffective at reducing serious crime
JUST KEEP THEM AWAY FROM US: SEX REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION LAWS
Describe Megan's law, the rationale for it and the impact that it has had
Discuss the reoffending rate of sex offenders and why registration and notification laws do not protect society
Discuss the problems associated with the current registration and notification requirements
Outline
GETTING CRIMINALS OFF THE STREET
In 2009, the harsh and punitive sentences that fell under New York's 1973 Rockefeller Drug Law, which served as the model for similar sentences in the U.S, were either eliminated or scaled back
The incarceration of offenders has been argues by conservatives as an effective policy in reducing crime, while liberals have posited that the practice has resulted in various consequences (e.g., costs, fund diversion, racial disparities, and prison overcrowding)
Locking up offenders and keeping them locked up is a main conservative crime control strategy
"Lock 'em up" proposals include preventive detention, incapacitation and mandatory sentencing
These strategies seek to limit the discretion of judges, because they are too lenient and American policies encourage not locking people up
Preventive Detention
Conservatives believe people on bail commit a lot of crime
Preventive detention raises the constitutional question of whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits detention for the purpose of preventing crime and the empirical question of whether preventive detention will reduce serious crime
In United States v. Salerno (1984) the Supreme Court ruled there is no right to bail and preventive detention is legitimate
A Short History of Bail Reform
Preventive detention is a backlash against the first bail reform movement of the 1960s that found defendants who could not afford bail were more like to be convicted and imprisoned
Current data support earlier findings that pretrial detention increases the likelihood that one will be convicted of a felony and incarcerated
In order to correct these problems bail reform in the form of release on recognizance (ROR) was directed by federal and adopted by state courts
Bail reform reduced the percentage of people in jail awaiting trial, but did not eliminate discrimination against the unemployed or the practice of keeping defendants in jail by setting high bail
Seriousness and prior record influence pretrial decisions
The bail reform movement coincided with the rise in serious crime between the sixties and seventies and led conservatives to argue bail reform contributed to the rising crime rate
A backlash involved publicly supported preventive detention laws
An Early Test: Preventive Detention in Washington, D.C.
In 1970 a D.C. law allowed a judge to hold a defendant charged with a violent or dangerous crime for 60 days if they had been convicted of a crime in the last 10 years, a narcotics addict or on pretrial release, probation or parole
The law was hardly ever used
Federal prosecutors exercised their discretion not to use the law because they continued to set high bail as a method of pretrial detention
The practice of setting high bail for purposes of detention continues today
The 1984 Federal Bail Reform Act
This act allowed judges to detain a defendant without bail to assure the safety of the community and its extensive use has increased the number of detained defendants, especially for drug offenses
The overall detention rate did not increase, because the law gave judges the legal authority to do what they had previously done covertly
None of the studies has evaluated the impact of preventive detention on overall crime rates, but only a small percentage of defendants were rearrested on bail both before and after the Federal Bail Reform Act
Crime on Bail: Myths and Realities
Defendants on bail can fail by failing to appear at a scheduled court hearing (FTA) or by committing a crime
Defendants on bail do not commit that much crime
Few defendants intentionally flee and become fugitives from justice
The Prediction Problem Revisited
The point of preventive detention is to detain only those defendants likely to commit crime on bail
Predicting Dangerousness: Pretrial Drug Testing
People believe testing arrestees for drug use would be a reliable method of predicting the likelihood they will commit a crime on bail, but pretrial drug testing did not predict rearrests, except for heroin use
Cocaine use was a predictor of FTAs; the best predictor of rearrest was the number of prior arrests
A Natural Experiment
A New York law authorizing preventive detention of juveniles who posed a "serious risk" produced a natural experiment, because an appeal later found the law to be unconstitutional
Judges ordered some juveniles detained which allowed for an examination of the accuracy of their predictions
Judges were reasonably accurate in their predictions (excluding predicting violent behavior), but had a high rate of false positives
The goal of policy reform is to make marginal improvement, but the use of an actuarial method for making preventive detention decisions would have translated to five false positives for every true positive
This led Fagan and Guggenheim to conclude the accuracy of prediction remains questionable and preventive detention is unjustified due its costs and limited marginal gains
Proposition 20: Preventive detention will not reduce serious crime
Speedy Trial: A Better Way
Speedy trial is a good way to prevent crime on bail and FTA because many rearrests occur within a short time following pretrial release
Unfortunately, speedy trial laws have been evaded by courtroom work groups
Proposition 21: Speedy trials can reduce crime while preserving constitutional rights
THE PHILOSOPHY OF INCAPACITATION
Incapacitation seeks to reduce crime by keeping offenders off the street, without trying to deter or rehabilitate them
Selective incapacitation is designed to lock up only the few high-rate offenders or career criminals
Gross incapacitation involves locking up large numbers of offenders regardless of their criminal histories
Selective Incapacitation: The Rand Formula
Selective incapacitation was hot in the 1970s and 1980s
In a 1982 study by Peter Greenwood and Rand, it was estimated that a selective incapacitation strategy could reduce crime while reducing the prison population
The Rand sentencing proposal was based on the Rand Inmate Survey (RIS) which estimated controversial annual offending rates
The Rand system suffered from the prediction problem as well as the problem of estimating annual offending rates because averages are inflated by extremely high rates for the worst offenders
The Rand prediction scale used employment history as a criterion for sentencing with as much weight as a prior conviction
The political obstacle facing Rand was that the idea of not imprisoning low-risk and medium-risk offenders was what corrections experts were advocating as far back as the 1960s
Proposition 22: Selective Incapacitation is not a realistic strategy for reducing serious crime
Gross Incapacitation: Zedlewski's New Math
Selective incapacitation has been ignored and gross incapacitation has been adopted and is the main reason the prison population has soared
Zedlewski reported that for every dollar spent on prison $17 is saved in social costs, although his methodology was seriously flawed by using one of the highest estimates of 187 crimes per year, thus deliberately misrepresenting the facts
He did not account for the problem of diminishing returns where locking people up skims off high rate offenders, leads to incarceration of less serious offenders and gives us lower returns in crime reduction and dollar savings
His estimate of dollar savings is flawed because a reduction in crime does not produce a direct reduction in CJS costs
The most devastating attack were his estimates of crime reduction; using the highest average offending rates means crime would have been eliminated
Offenders don't average 187 crimes a year and while some offenders are incarcerated, others replace them (known as the replacement factor)
Incapacitation: A Sober Estimate
Zimring and Hawkins used a sophisticated model to conclude that each incarceration prevented 3.5 crimes per year in CA; Locking up 115,000 people would reduce the crime rate by 15%
Zimring and Hawkins concluded it was not clear that incapacitation was the primary cause of the drop in crime, due to some unexpected data trends
A cross-state comparison of changes in incarceration rates and crime rates showed no clear patterned relationship
Crime declined in the 1990s, but we've been on an imprisonment binge for 25 years. You can't claim success for a prescription that failed for 19 years and then suddenly appeared to work in the twentieth year.
Proposition 23: Gross incapacitation does not reduce serious crime
Collateral Damage: The Cost of Overimprisonment
Prison overcrowding
Directly contributes to the resource crisis
Inability to Provide Treatment Alternatives
Imprisonment diverts funds from drug courts and other treatment initiatives that are more effective
High Prison Medical Expenses
Longer terms, overcrowding and risky behaviors in prison result in various medical expenses associated with elderly inmates, communicable diseases, HIV and Hepatitis C
Crowding Out Other Social Needs
Mass imprisonment has diverted funds from education
Between 1987-2007, states increased spending on prison 127%, while spending on education increased only 21%
Racial and Ethnic Discrimination
People of color represent two-thirds of the prisoners serving life sentences, and 90% of the NY inmates convicted under the Rockefeller Drug laws
Destructive Social Effects
Gross incapacitation impacts families (e.g., child support), communities and democracy itself (e.g., the right to vote)
MANDATORY SENTENCING
All states had some form of mandatory sentence by 1994 that typically apply to certain offenses
Leading conservative crime control strategy and is operationalized in two ways: mandatory imprisonment fo certain crimes and mandatory minimums prison sentences
Its popularity can be explained by the celebrated case syndrome
"THE NATION'S TOUGHEST DRUG LAW"
1973 New York law (known as the Rockefeller Drug Law) was designed to incapacitate and deter future use through mandatory and long prison terms, restrictions on plea bargaining and mandatory prison terms
Three categories of offenders were major, middle-level and minor dealers
The law attempted to prevent the abuse of plea bargaining
Enormous slippage or leakage occurred between arrest and conviction that actually resulted in decreased indictment and conviction rates
The law did not completely fail in its objectives; for those convicted, the rate of incarceration increased, however almost half evaded mandatory sentencing provisions
The slippage or leakage is explained by the CJ law of thermodynamics
An increase in the severity of the potential punishment results in
pressure to avoid its actual application
Much slippage involved CJ officials adapting to the harsh terms of the law
Slippage can also occur after sentencing as more offenders sentenced for longer terms results in overcrowding and the response is to release prisoners early
Finally, the law had no significant effect on crime or drug use
The Long Term-Impact - and the 2009 Reform
Rockefeller Drug laws resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of people sent to prison on drug charges; primarily impacting lower-level offenders, minorities, and resulting in prison overcrowding
The 2009 reform reduced the penalties
Eliminating mandatory sentences for lower level drug offenses
Expanding treatment and alternative options to incarceration
Allowed for resentencing of some currently imprisoned offenders
THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Implemented in 1987, the guidelines included several mandatory sentencing provisions that have contributed to the increase in the federal prison population
There is mixed evidence on the compliance of prosecutors and judges
Less than half of offenders eligible for mandatory minimums are receiving them and defendants are allowed to avoid them through plea bargaining
Through prosecutorial discretion mandatory sentences are not necessarily mandatory in practice which makes them more arbitrary
The Growth of Life Sentences
By 2008, 1 in 11 inmates were serving a life term
The harsher sentences encourage prosecutorial discretion to avoid them
Public pressure for getting tough has affected pardons and commutations for those ith life sentences
Life terms are disproportionate to the risk of reoffending; recidivism decreases with age
Life terms aggravate the costs of dealing with elderly inmates
Mandatory Sentencing and Crime
1996 report found no correlation between incarceration rates and crime rates
Proposition 24: Mandatory sentencing is not an effective means of reducing serious crime
THREE STRIKESWE ARE ALL OUT
Three strikes is the most popular idea in mandatory sentencing; it generally calls for a mandatory life prison sentence for anyone convicted of a third felony
State laws vary considerable in terms of strikable offenses and second strikes
The idea has been almost universally condemned by criminologists and other sentencing experts
It is criticized for not focusing on serious repeat offenders
It is actually not new as most states had repeat offender laws for decades, though they were rarely used
Implementation
Besides CA and GA states have not used their three-strikes laws, so they have become plea bargaining tools
Impact on Crime
CA law was more punitive and far-reaching as it applied for any felony
The law sent a lot of people to prison for long terms, but did not send as many as had been expected because it was not implemented in most counties
The law weighed most heavily on less serious non-violent offenses and compounded racial disparities as more African Americans received it
The law did not produce a reduction in crime and would have only had a modest impact if it was fully implemented
Summary: Striking Out
Classic example of overreaction to celebrated case
Crude policy that sweeps nondangerous criminals rather than a precise instrument that locks up dangerous repeat offenders
Laws are not consistently implemented so they are arbitrary
They upset the going rate and impose new costs on the CJS
There is no clear evidence that these laws will reduce serious crime
Old repeat offender laws failed to distinguish among seriousness (gravity), repetitiveness (prior record or criminal career), intensity (rate of annual offending), and dangerousness (assessment of harm the offender might do in the community)
Proposition 25: Three strikes and you're out laws are a terrible crime policy
JUST KEEP THEM AWAY FROM US: SEX REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION LAWS
All 50 states have Megan's Laws designed to control sex offenders through registration and community notification
An expansion of the categories of sex offenders required to register was established with the Adam Walsh Act of 2006
Advocates believe sex offenders pose a high risk of reoffending and registration will assist law enforcement in surveillance and arrest and notification will allow residents to take protective measures
Less than one-third of sex offenders recidivate, demonstrating that reoffending by sex offenders is greatly exaggerated
Research shows parolees convicted of rape have lower rearrest rates than for all felons combined as well as lower than robbers and burglars
Data suggests registration and notification do not protect the public from the real potential offenders, given the majority of victims know their offender
The Celebrated Case Syndrome Again
There are a number of problems that exist with current registration and notification laws for sex offenders
Overbreadth: The laws cover a vast amount of persons who are not truly dangerous offenders (e.g., public order offenses, consensual sex, prostitution, and childish pranks, such as playing doctor); additionally there is overbreadth in the amount of time people are required to register with 17 states requiring lifetime registration
Residency Restrictions: The restrictions limit where sex offenders can live and are considered the harshest and most arbitrary
Enforcement Problems
Given the overbreadth, law enforcement cannot keep track of all sex offenders
The restrictions drive the offenders underground and separate offenders from family
Notification hinders the readjustment to society (e.g., difficulty finding housing and employment, generating threats and harassment, and creating an atmosphere of social ostracism)
Registration, restriction and notification interfere with effective treatment for sex offenders
Failure to Protect Society
Offenders are likely to recidivate if they travel far from their current living location
Most offenders meet their victims through social networking sites, not as strangers on the street
Are There Effective Treatment Programs?
Cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) has shown promising, however its success depends on offender's cooperation
Proposition 26: Sex offender registration, notification, and residency restrictions laws are not effective in preventing repeat sex crimes, and in certain respects inhibit effective control and treatment of offender
CONCLUSION
Lock 'em up strategies appear to be simple and effective but they are not simple in practice
We can't precisely identify the small group of high-rate offenders
Gross incapacitation policies create problems for the CJS
Because of such problems the courtroom work group tends to evade extremely punitive laws
No conclusive evidence indicates locking people up will reduce crime
It is not clear that even if they reduced crime that they would be worth the enormous financial investment
Key Terms
United States v. Salerno: A 1984 Supreme Court ruling that there is no right to bail and that preventive detention is a legitimate regulatory measure
ROR: An innovative bail reform measure which allowed a defendant to be released without any financial consideration
Incapacitation: A crime policy that seeks to reduce crime by keeping criminals off the street without trying to rehabilitate or deter them
Selective Incapacitation: Is designed to lock up only the few high-rate offenders or career criminals
Gross Incapacitation: Involves locking up large numbers of offenders regardless of their criminal histories
Average Annual Offending Rate: The rate at which an average offender (or high-rate offender) commits in a given year
Mandatory Sentencing: An incapacitation strategy that takes the form of mandatory imprisonment for a certain crime and/or a mandatory minimum prison term
Slippage or Leakage: A process explained by the criminal justice law of thermodynamics where CJ professionals evade the implementation of a new law or policy that results in more people escaping conviction and punishment than was intended
Three Strikes: Is form of mandatory sentencing that generally calls for a mandatory life prison sentence for anyone convicted of a third felony, but many variations (such as second-strike provisions) exist
Megan's Law: A federal law requiring sex offenders who are released to the community to register with state officials
Chapter 8
Close the Loopholes
Learning Objectives
PROSECUTE THE CAREER CRIMINALS
Compare and contrast horizontal and vertical prosecution
Discuss the research findings that compare special prosecution units and traditional prosecutions
Describe the effects of the San Diego Major Violator Unit and explain why these effects occurred
Defend the argument that special prosecution units do not result in any better or worse results than traditional prosecutions
ABOLISH THE INSANITY DEFENSE
Explain how the Hinckley case distorted public opinion about the insanity defense
Defend the argument that defendants who successfully use the insanity defense are not beating the rap
Explain the dangerousness of the criminally insane
Evaluate the use and effectiveness and impact of the insanity defense, specifically NGRI and GBMI
Construct and defend an argument regarding abolishing the insanity defense that includes the important role of mens rea
ABOLISH OR REFORM PLEA BARGAINING?
Differentiate between conservative and liberal views of plea bargaining
Appraise the effects of Alaska's plea bargaining ban
Explain the plea bargaining reforms made in King County and its impact on overall case handling
RESTRICT APPEALS
List the ways in which appeals are thought to undermine criminal justice administration according to conservatives
Explain the Habeus Corpus Act and the impact of the Fay v. Noia decision on Habeus Corpus proceedings
Defend the argument that limiting appeals will not reduce serious crime
Outline
PROSECUTE THE CAREER CRIMINALS
Conservatives believe that many dangerous criminals beat the system and escape punishment through loopholes in the system
To make sure dangerous criminals are punished, prosecutors have created major offender or career criminal prosecution programs
Horizontal prosecution passes a case along from one prosecutor/group of prosecutors to another prosecutor/group of prosecutors as the case makes its way from initial filing and arraignment to trial and plea bargaining
Vertical prosecution involves one prosecutor throughout the trial process (charges, trial/plea bargains) and has a number of advantages
Close involvement from start to end allows for inclusion of all relevant details
Due to involvement in the case and with victims, there is less likelihood of negotiating lesser charges
Crime victims deal with only one prosecutor
Prosecutor specializes in certain areas (e.g., sex crimes, gun crimes)
Continuity eliminates disparities
Does a Special Prosecutorial Unit Make a Difference?
Comparing Two Cities
Comparison research of one site with a special prosecutorial unit - vertical prosecution - (Kansas City, MO) and one without - horizontal prosecution - (Miami, FL) demonstrated that in both offices the strength of evidence and the likelihood of conviction shaped decisions; no loophole existed to allow for offenders to slip through and escape charges
The San Diego Major Violator Unit
The San Diego Major Violator Unit involved a program with continuity of prosecution targeting robbery and special cases of robbery-related homicide
The program also restricted charge bargains
The program had only a modest impact on conviction rates and rates of inmates sentenced to prison, because prosecutors were already tough
The program increased the percentage of convicted offenders sent to prison, because the category included split sentences
Public misunderstanding about split sentences contributes to perceptions of the system as lenient, but offenders are not beating the system
Length of incarceration increased during the program, but it was rising across the country so some increase would have occurred without it
The evaluation did not measure the impact of the program on the crime rate, but small changes in conviction and incarceration suggest minimal impact
The overall findings on prosecution of career criminals demonstrate
The CJS is tough on repeat offenders
The patterns of prosecution and sentencing show the going rate agreed by the local courtroom workgroup
Proposition 27: Special prosecution units do not produce either higher conviction rates or lower crime rates
ABOLISH THE INSANITY DEFENSE
John W. Hinckley
Hinckley's acquittal in the attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan in 1981 sparked a national outcry and changes in laws on the insanity defense
People were outraged over Hinckley's verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity which made people think guilty people beat the rap and get off due to technicalities, though Hinckley was and remains institutionalized
In one public opinion survey 87% of respondents felt the insanity defense was a loophole and 40% called it a rich person's defense
The conservative response is to close the loophole and there are six ways to do so; abolish the insanity defense, change the test of insanity, shift the burden of proof to the defendant, create new guilty but mentally ill verdict, revise trial procedure for raising an insanity plea, changing procedures for committing a person found NGRI
Sorting Out the Issues
The issues include the extent the insanity defense is used, the fate of those who win acquittal, predicting dangerousness and the effect of abolishing the insanity defense
The Reality of the Insanity Defense
The insanity defense is very rarely used successfully (less than 1% of all indictments) though polls have found that people believed 40% of all criminal defendants use it and half of them wanted it abolished
Therefore, closing the loophole would not impact crime and it wouldn't impact robbery and burglary since the defense is most often raised in murder cases
Successful use of the insanity defense occurs in as a result of plea bargaining or stipulated finding agreed to by the courtroom workgroup
Another myth about the insanity defense is that dangerous people use it; those who do use the insanity defense have serious mental health issues and slipped through many safety nets
Aftermath of Acquittal
Liberals claim people committed to mental institutions after winning NGRI verdicts spend more time in mental hospitals than they would have in prison
Mentally ill people used to be hospitalized for years, but the case of Baxstrom v. Herold (1966) necessitated procedures for continued confinement
For all crimes except murder, persons hospitalized after being found NGRI still spend more time confined in hospitals than comparable offenders found guilty spend in prison
A study attempting to determine whether defendants found incompetent to stand trial "beat the rap" found they spent an average of two years in prison prior to conviction; the system is not turning dangerous psychotics loose
Danger to the Community
The forced release of criminal defendants created a natural experiment testing the dangerousness of the criminally insane. A total of 14.5% appeared to be dangerous and recidivism rates for persons acquitted by reason of insanity was no greater than of felons
This data translates into six false positives for each true positive, so prediction is still a problem
The Impact of Abolition
Abolishing the insanity defense presents complex legal problems around the issue of innocent until proven guilty, guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and the establishment of actus reus, mens rea and a connection between the two
The key issue with the insanity defense is the different degrees of intent
Some people are recognized as lacking full criminal intent because they do not understand what they are doing
M'Naughton case established the right wrong test in 1843 and alternatives such as the irresistible impulse test have been created since then
Attempts to abolish the insanity defense could be interpreted to mean an abolishment of the mens rea requirement and degrees of crime
States that have tried to abolish the insanity defense have created laws that were later declared unconstitutional under due process clauses of the states
A limited interpretation might result in an affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of insanity rather than an ordinary defense
It is hard to say what would happen if insanity were abolished as an affirmative defense, because few states have done it and there are so few cases, but the underlying issues would likely reappear in a different form
The flaws of GBMI are that it strikes indirectly at the mens rea requirement, creates a lesser and included offense that might be a compromise and does not guarantee treatment for the person declared mentally ill
Prisons and jails cannot handle current inmates with mental problems, so GBMI may find themselves in a cycle of deteriorated mental health in prison and improved health upon transfer to a mental hospital
GMBI is a bogus reform because it involves people who would have been found guilty, not defendants who would have been found NGRI
Evaluation of another state's GBMI law found to reduction in insanity pleas, more confused jurors and offenders receiving GBMI placed on probation rather than receiving medical treatment
Proposition 28: Abolishing or limiting the insanity defense will have no impact on serious crime
ABOLISH OR REFORM PLEA BARGAINING?
Plea bargaining is disliked by all as conservatives see it as a loophole and liberals feel it is a source of injustice as some people get better deals and defense attorneys do not fight for their clients
In 2004, 97% of felony cases in large urban counties were settled by guilty plea
Comparative analysis between the U.S. and European countries conclude that unchecked prosecutorial discretion is a distinct feature of the U.S. CJS
Efforts to eliminate issues with plea bargain fall into two categories: abolish or reform
Abolishing Plea Bargaining: Alaska Tries
The most celebrated attempt to abolish plea bargaining attacked it by forbidding sentence and charge bargaining and establishing procedures for plea negotiations
The traditional defense that plea bargaining is an essential tool to handle heavy caseloads proved to be false
The prediction that discretion would simply shift also did not occur as the rate of dismissals remained high before and after the ban
Cases actually moved through the courts faster because there was less to negotiate
The most significant result was that the ban had no impact on defendants charged with serious crimes or with substantial criminal records because dangerous offenders had not been beating the system beforehand
The ban did produce more severe sentences in less serious cases which is known as the bait and switch
No evaluation addressed whether the plea bargaining ban affected the crime rate, but since it has no real affect on case disposition, it likely did not
Reforming Plea Bargaining in King County, Washington
King County, WA, uses a more structured process for handling cases, with clear rules for plea negotiations and higher levels of supervision
A horizontal approach to prosecution is used in which cases are first handled by the Charging Unit and then passed to the Early Plea Unit (EPU); cases not settled though a guilty plea are then handled by the Trial Unit
Regulations maintain that plea bargains must go through the EPU or they are not accepted; cannot occur at trial, and must be in writing
The net result was a high level of consistency in case processing; 70% of cases were settled by EPU, the courtroom workgroup worked together for appropriateness of charges, and a conservative charging policy was in place
Adaptations did occur due to long standing personal relationships among courtroom workgroup members
The more formal process in place in King County did not result in significant changes in case handling, although greater efficiency and openness occurred due to rules being known and increased supervision enhanced case consistency
In Search of Plea Bargains
Plea bargaining is a phantom loophole; it survives due to the CJ wedding cake and the shared norm of proportionality held by the courtroom work group
Proposition 29: Abolishing plea bargaining will not reduce serious crime
RESTRICT APPEALS
Conservatives believe post-conviction appeals undermine CJS by allowing offenders to escape punishment all together or to have final resolution delayed which undermines the deterrent effect; additionally, appeals turn the criminal process into a "game"
There are many possible avenues for appeal that are "seemingly" endless
Limiting Appeals
1981 Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime recommended a three-year statute of limitations on habeas corpus petitions and a prohibition on federal courts' holding evidentiary hearings
Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 is a device to challenge the detention of a person taken into custody
In Fay v. Noia (1963) the Supreme Court expanded the ability of an offender convicted in a state court to obtain a rehearing in federal court
The Reality of Postconviction Appeals
Postconviction appeals play a minor role in the administration of justice as only 1% of them succeed
A study on whether offenders abuse the right to appeal found that the equivalent of only 1.4% of offenders filed habeas corpus petitions, which is because most convictions are obtained through plea bargains
The workload of the courts has been exaggerated when in reality appeals represented only 4% of civil case filings in U.S. District Courts
An exception to the rule includes people on death row who exhaust every possible appeal and should because mistakes happen
Another exception involves "writ writers" or file innumerable appeals in federal court challenging their conviction or prison conditions, but these individuals are a tiny proportion of all inmates; since few succeed their impact on the crime rate would be negligible
Appeals do not delay finality and undermine the deterrent effect, because appeals are filed in few cases and could not have broad impact; besides, many factors affect the deterrent effect so appeals are only a minor factor
Proposition 30: Limiting habeas corpus appeals of criminal convictions will have no effect on serious crime
Conclusion
Closing loopholes will not reduce serious crime, because loopholes do not exist
The idea that criminals beat the system through the insanity defense, plea bargains, and appeals is a perception based on a small number of unrepresentative celebrated cases
Te justice system is fairly harsh with serious offenders who have been arrested
Key Terms
Major-Offender Prosecution Programs: A prosecution program that focuses special attention on career criminals to make sure they are prosecuted, convicted and incarcerated
Split Sentences: A sentence where the offender does some time in jail followed by a release on probation
Actus Reus: The fact that the accused committed the act that must be established by the prosecution in order to prove guilt; this must be connected to mens rea
Mens Rea: The fact that the accused had criminal intent that must be established by the prosecution in order to prove guilt; this must be connected with the actus reus
M'Naughton Rule: The right wrong test of insanity. To prove insanity it must be demonstrated that the accused did not know the difference between right and wrong
Affirmative Defense: Says that the accused killed the victim and intended to but s/he does not have criminal responsibility for the act because of the defense they are using
Ordinary Defense: At attempt to show that the prosecution has failed to connect the accused with the crime
Step by Step Solution
There are 3 Steps involved in it
Get step-by-step solutions from verified subject matter experts
