answer this

___'__'_~ \\" 1"__"'I (15 points) Consider the following game scenario: Player 1 chooses one of two ACTIONS, L or R. Player 2 observes Player 1's action and chooses his own action. If Player 1 chose L then Player 2 can choose either A or B and the game ends. The payoffs in this case are 100 and 5 for Players 1 and 2 respectively if Player 2 chooses A and 4 and 6 respectively if Player 2 chooses B. If Player 1 chose R then Player 2 can choose either C or D. Player 1 gets to act again. Player 1 can choose either X or Y. If Player 2 chose C and Player 1 chose X then the payoffs are 5 and 3 for Players 1 and 2 respectively. If Player 2 chose C and Player 1 chose Y then the payoffs are 4 and 3 for Players 1 and 2 respectively. If Player 2 chose D and Player 1 chose X then the WWW respectively. If Player 2 chose D and Player 1 chose Y then the payoffs are 3 and 6 for Players 1 and 2 respectively. Consider the two cases: 1. Player 1 observes Player 2's Action (C or D) before choosing his action (X or Y). 11. Player I does not observe Player 2's action before choosing his action. Write the extensive form of the game (game tree) in each of the two cases and find the Subgame Perfect Nash equilibria in case I. K