assume the huawei and xiaomi have a large inventory of mid-range smart phone that they would like
Question:
assume the huawei and xiaomi have a large inventory of mid-range smart phone that they would like to sell before a new generation of faster, cheaper mid-range smart phone is introduced. assume that the question facing each competitor is whether or not they should widely advertise a “discounted” sale on these discontinued items, or instead let excess inventory work itself off over the next few months. if both aggressively promote their products with a nationwide advertising campaign, each will earn profits of $6 million. f one advertises while the other does not, the firm that advertises will earn $15 million, while the one that does not advertise will earn $2 million. if neither advertises, both will earn $11 million. assume this is a one-shot game, and both firms seek to maximize profits. xiaomi promotion strategy advertise don’t advertise huawei advertise $ 6 million $ 6 million $ 15 million $ 2 million don’t advertise $ 2 million $ 15 million $ 11 million $ 11 million a. what is the dominant strategy for each firm? are these also secure strategies? b. what is the nash equilibrium? c. would collusion work in this case?
Introduction to Probability and Statistics
ISBN: 978-1133103752
14th edition
Authors: William Mendenhall, Robert Beaver, Barbara Beaver