AUCTION. Consider two bidders whose values are iid draws from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. (a)[3pt.] Derive the optimal expected revenue. What auction format can ensure this rev- enue? (b)(2pt.] Assume that, instead of 0, the seller's value is 0.75 for the good. Describe the allocation rule of the first price auction where the seller would not sell the item unless the highest bidder offers at least 0.75. AUCTION. Consider two bidders whose values are iid draws from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. (a)[3pt.] Derive the optimal expected revenue. What auction format can ensure this rev- enue? (b)(2pt.] Assume that, instead of 0, the seller's value is 0.75 for the good. Describe the allocation rule of the first price auction where the seller would not sell the item unless the highest bidder offers at least 0.75