a.With A > B, D > C and a > c, d > b, we have a coordination game (e.g., battle of spouses, stag hunt, assurance games). With B > A > D > C and c > a > d > b, we have a cooperation game (e.g., prisoners dilemma, public goods, tragedy of the commons). With B > A > C > D and b > d > c > a, we have an anti-coordination game (e.g., chicken, hawk-dove). With A > B, D > C and b > a, c > d, we have a discoordination game (e.g., matching pennies, run vs pass, attack by land vs attack by sea). In each case pleasei. Derive and graph the best response correspondences. ii. Show how the mixed strategy nash equilibrium (if one exists) depends on the relative payoffs using an equation and by illustrating in the graphed best response correspondences. iii. Provide a two-sentence example from a natural resource, mineral, energy, or environmental policy or market. b. Imagine that there is an additional pre-game round of communication in which players can send messages/threats/promises about which strategies they plan to play. For eachof the cases of battle of spouses (A > D > B > C and d > a > c > b), assurance (A > D > B > C and a > d > c > b), prisoners dilemma (B > A > D > C and c > a > d > b), and chicken (B > A > C > D and b > d > c > a), state whether this additional round of communication could or could not affect the Nash equilibrium that is reached, and why. You do not need to set up and solve this game just write a very short justification