b) Skyline Inc. is a risk-neutral prot maximizing enterprise. For each sold apartment, they receive a prot of 500. They directly cannot sell any apartment. Their salesperson Jimwho is a risk-averse agentta kes ca re of the sale. The probability of sale depends on Jim who may laze, try a bit or work hard. More effort means more disutility for Jim but more probability of sale for Skyline as given in the following table. Effort Disutility Probability of Sale Iaze 0 0.1 try a bit 1 0.3 work hard 2 0.4 Jim's utility is given by 11w - dlsutillty of effort, where w is the monetary compensation received. Jim's efforts are neither observable nor enforceable by Skyline Inc. Skyline is considering the following contracts for Jim: C1: Jim receives a constant pay of 100 in lieu of working hard. C2: Jim receives a base wage of 36 and a bonus of 108 whenever an apartment is sold. C3: Jim receives no base wage and a bonus of 400 whenever an apartment is sold For each contact what will be Jim's effort level and Skyline's prot? Explain