Question: Back to Assignment Attempts Do No Harm / 2 7 . Solving for dominant strategies and the Nash equilibrium Suppose Ethan and Cadence are playing

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Attempts Do No Harm /2
7. Solving for dominant strategies and the Nash equilibrium
Suppose Ethan and Cadence are playing a game that requires both to simultaneously choose an action: Up or Down. The payoff matrix that follows shows the earnings of each person as a function of both of their choices. For example, the upper-right cell shows that if Ethan chooses Up and Cadence chooses Down, Ethan will receive a payoff of 6 and Cadence will receive a payoff of 4.
\table[[Ethan,,Cadence],[,Up,Down],[Up,4,3,6,4],[Down,6,7,7,6]]
In this game, the only dominant strategy is for to choose
The outcome reflecting the unique Nash equilibrium in this game is as follows: Ethan chooses q, and Cadence chooses
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