Based on game theory answer the question.

Figure 2: Prispnners' Dilemma Player B Player A D. Number left- {right} efcpmma refers to A's {E's} payp. (a) Each player always plays :3. {3 points} {b} Each player always plays :21. {3 paints} {c} Player A alternates between :3 and d, while player 2 always plays c; if any player deviates from this scenario, then each player plays :1 thereafter. [3 points} {cl} Each player plays :3, and if a player deviates, then he plays c, and the other player plays d thereafter. [3 paints} 2 From Here to Eternity - 12 points Consider the following stage game, assuming the discount rate is 6 = 0.99. Check whether the strategy profiles are SPNE in the infinitely repeated game