Bonus Problem (Optional, 25 marks) We consider 1-period bargaining games as follows: e There are two players in the games and these two players are working on an investment project o Firstly, player 1 make his offer to player 2. The offer can be denoted by (x, 1 x), where x denotes the proportion of revenue received by player 1 from the project. For example, (0.2, 0.8) indicates that player 1 will receive 20% of the revenue and player 2 will receive 80% of the revenue. e After knowing the player 1's offer, player 2 decides the amount of effort (High effort or low effort) to be spent for the project. - If the player 2 decides to spend high effort, the total revenue of the project will be vy. On the other hand, the cost of choosing high effort is ;; for player 2 and player 1 does not need to pay any cost. - If the player 2 decides to spend low effort, the corresponding revenue of the project will be v; (v;, >0,cy >c, >0and vy cy > v, ;. Determine the subgame perfect equilibrium of the games