Brief the attached appellate court case, the brief of State v. Coe should be no longer than one page. The briefing must follow the following format: Give the: Citation. Facts. Issues. Decision. Reasons.

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STATE v. COLE 4/1/1991 Heard November 13, 1990. Decided April 1, 1991. Rehearing Denied April 30, 1991. Appellant Roger Wayne Cole was convicted of driving under a suspended license, second offense, in violation of S.C. Code Ann. 56- 1-460 (Supp. 1989). The question presented is whether we recognize necessity as a defense to driving under a suspended license. I. FACTS Appellant stipulated that he was driving under a suspended license. However, appellant claims that there were emergency circumstances which justified his driving. Appellant testified that his wife, who was six months pregnant, was having pains in her back and stomach and needed help. Appellant did not have a telephone, so he walked to his only neighbor's house to use theirs, but no one answered the door. Appellant then drove to the nearest telephone, about a mile and a half away, called his mother-in-law, and asked her to take his wife to the hospital. As he was returning to his house, appellant was stopped by the police for a broken tail light and was arrested for driving under a suspended license. II. DISCUSSION Appellant argues that the trial judge erred by refusing to charge the jury on the defense of necessity. This Court has recognized the defense of necessity in the prison escape context. See State v. Henderson, 298 S.C. 331, 380 S.E.2d 817 (1989); State v. Worley, 265 S.C. 551, 220 S.E.2d 242 (1975). However, we have never recognized the doctrine of necessity as a defense to driving under a suspended license. The defense of necessity is closely related to that of duress. In fact, modern courts have tended to blur the distinction between duress and necessity. See 1 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law 5.4 (1986). However, common law distinguished between the defenses of duress and necessity: STATE v. COLE 4/1/1991 Heard November 13, 1990. Decided April 1, 1991. Rehearing Denied April 30, 1991. Appellant Roger Wayne Cole was convicted of driving under a suspended license, second offense, in violation of S.C. Code Ann. 56- 1-460 (Supp. 1989). The question presented is whether we recognize necessity as a defense to driving under a suspended license. I. FACTS Appellant stipulated that he was driving under a suspended license. However, appellant claims that there were emergency circumstances which justified his driving. Appellant testified that his wife, who was six months pregnant, was having pains in her back and stomach and needed help. Appellant did not have a telephone, so he walked to his only neighbor's house to use theirs, but no one answered the door. Appellant then drove to the nearest telephone, about a mile and a half away, called his mother-in-law, and asked her to take his wife to the hospital. As he was returning to his house, appellant was stopped by the police for a broken tail light and was arrested for driving under a suspended license. II. DISCUSSION Appellant argues that the trial judge erred by refusing to charge the jury on the defense of necessity. This Court has recognized the defense of necessity in the prison escape context. See State v. Henderson, 298 S.C. 331, 380 S.E.2d 817 (1989); State v. Worley, 265 S.C. 551, 220 S.E.2d 242 (1975). However, we have never recognized the doctrine of necessity as a defense to driving under a suspended license. The defense of necessity is closely related to that of duress. In fact, modern courts have tended to blur the distinction between duress and necessity. See 1 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law 5.4 (1986). However, common law distinguished between the defenses of duress and necessity:

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Answer STATE v COLE Citation State v Cole 1991 SC LEXIS 36 SC Apr 1 1991 Facts Roger Wayne Cole Appe... View the full answer