(Burning a bridge) Army 1, of country 1, must decide whether to attack army 2, of...

 

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(Burning a bridge) Army 1, of country 1, must decide whether to attack army 2, of country 2, which is occupying an island between the two countries. In the event of an attack, army 2 may fight, or retreat over a bridge to its mainland. Each army prefers to occupy the island than not to occupy it; a fight is the worst outcome for both armies. a. Model this situation as an extensive game with perfect information. That is, write down the set of players, set of terminal histories, player function, and players' preferences for the game above. b. Draw the game tree for the game. c. Find the Nash equilibrium of the game. d. Find the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. e. Show that army 2 can increase its equilibrium payoff by burning the bridge to its mainland, eliminating its option to retreat if attacked. And give your intuitive explanation for this. (Burning a bridge) Army 1, of country 1, must decide whether to attack army 2, of country 2, which is occupying an island between the two countries. In the event of an attack, army 2 may fight, or retreat over a bridge to its mainland. Each army prefers to occupy the island than not to occupy it; a fight is the worst outcome for both armies. a. Model this situation as an extensive game with perfect information. That is, write down the set of players, set of terminal histories, player function, and players' preferences for the game above. b. Draw the game tree for the game. c. Find the Nash equilibrium of the game. d. Find the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. e. Show that army 2 can increase its equilibrium payoff by burning the bridge to its mainland, eliminating its option to retreat if attacked. And give your intuitive explanation for this.

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Ans A Model this situation as an extensive game with perfect information That is write down the set of players set terminal histories function and players preferences for the game above Perfect inform... View the full answer