(c) [2 points] Suppose that firms set prices simultaneously. What are their prices in the Nash equilibrium, p; and p3?(d) [4 points] Now suppose that firms are still located at the ends of the street, but there are now zero travel costs: t = 0. What are the equilibrium prices?3. [12 points total] Consider a Hotelling duopoly model with a street of length 1 (mile). The total utility cost to a consumer at location r of buying from Firm i is 10d; + Pi Firms' marginal cost of production is MC = 20 and there are no fixed costs. The two firms are located at the ends of the street, so that Firm 1 is located at 0 and Firm 2 is located at 1. (a) [2 points] When prices are p, and p2, what is Firm 1's quantity? (It should depend on p, and p2.)