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Consider two nonprofit organizations working in Puerto Rico. Together, they could spend time coordinating their efforts and run a shelter for hurricane victims, providing each organization with 100 utils. Alternatively, they could individually distribute paper towels-a simple, low-cost, fast, and visible project-and receive 5 utils. This situation can be modeled with the following payoff matrix: v. What kind of game is this? How do you know? vi. In the absence of communication, what are the two nonprofits' mixed strategies? vii. Under what conditions will nonprofit 1 choose to run the shelter? (i.e., what are the probability cutoffs for each nonprofit choosing to run the shelter or distribute paper towels?) Show your work. viii. Assuming the two nonprofits could coordinate, what is the expected payoff of engaging in a mixed strategy rather than coordinating? (i.e. choosing to gamble based on probability cutoffs rather than communicate and coordinate in person?) Show your Consider two nonprofit organizations working in Puerto Rico. Together, they could spend time coordinating their efforts and run a shelter for hurricane victims, providing each organization with 100 utils. Alternatively, they could individually distribute paper towels-a simple, low-cost, fast, and visible project-and receive 5 utils. This situation can be modeled with the following payoff matrix: v. What kind of game is this? How do you know? vi. In the absence of communication, what are the two nonprofits' mixed strategies? vii. Under what conditions will nonprofit 1 choose to run the shelter? (i.e., what are the probability cutoffs for each nonprofit choosing to run the shelter or distribute paper towels?) Show your work. viii. Assuming the two nonprofits could coordinate, what is the expected payoff of engaging in a mixed strategy rather than coordinating? (i.e. choosing to gamble based on probability cutoffs rather than communicate and coordinate in person?) Show your