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United States Counterintelligence at the National Security Level: Operations Bodyguard & Lemon-Aid

INLT 410: Counterintelligence

INTRODUCTION

Historically for the United States, counterintelligence has broadly been referred to as an "us" versus "them" mentality since its inception (APUS 2020).The United States as a nation-state has maintained its share of enemies who opposed its politics, international actions, strategic ideology, and even its existence. Foreign nation-state opposition toward the United States can be generally depicted as military and foreign intelligence activity. In effort to thwart foreign opposition activity, the United States has consistently employed counterintelligence measures to" deny the opposition the ability to collect information or conduct harm, such as espionage or sabotage" (APUS 2020).

Since the early 1900s, a number of significant events have driven a change in perspective about how counterintelligence is conducted. The evolved perspective changed the way the United States protects itself from foreign intelligence entities. Two notable offensive counterintelligence operations dating back to World War II and the Cold War are briefly discussed and analyzed in this paper to depict their influence on the 2016 United States National Security Strategy. The two operations, Operation Bodyguard from World War II and Operation Lemon Aid from the Cold War, were both offensive counterintelligence efforts which were conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

THE BENSON HOUSE

In 1942 at the midst of World War II, the FBI initiated Operation Ostrich becoming aware of a British intelligence operation codenamed "Ultra," which "intercepted and later decoded radio and cable messages sent by the Nazis to their clandestine networks" (FBI 2011).Through liaison with the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6), the FBI was able to obtain information that indicated there were German spies on United States soil providing information to the Nazis.

The FBI, through their new relationship with MI-6, was able to identify those German spies and subsequently conduct a variety of successful double agent activities out of the "Benson House" located in Wading River, New York (FBI 2014).From January 1942 until June 1945, "FBI agents and radio technicians secretly living and working at the Benson House, broadcasted radio messages to the Germans in Hamburg who believed they were communicating with their espionage agents in the United States" (FBI 2014).This activity was only made possible through the FBI's recruitment of the German spies as double agents. The FBI's use of German double agents in a variety of operations allowed the United States to deceive the Nazis through funneling disinformation which was believed by the Germans to be "significant details about United States forces, munitions, and war preparations"(FBI 2014) The Benson House was a hub for a number of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence operations during World War II. In addition to Operations Ostrich and Bodyguard, there was another notable operation that involved German operative who worked out of the Benson House. The German operative lived in the United States as a small business owner and was "codenamed ND-98" after he offered his services to the FBI in exchange for money (FBI 2016). Throughout the war, the FBI directed ND-98 to exchange radio messages via telegraph to the Nazi intelligence services in Germany.

OPERATION LEMON-AID

During the Spring of 1977, the United States Navy's Naval Investigative Service (NIS) and the FBI suspected the Soviet Union had inserted intelligence officers into their United Nations Office (FBI 2016). The suspicion was that the Soviets were using the United Nation's Office as a front for espionage operations against the United States. In response, the NIS and FBI launched Operation Lemon-Aid. Operation Lemon-Aid was an offensive counterintelligence double agent operation which utilized a United States Navy lieutenant commander by the name of "Art Lindberg" (FBI 2016).

The NIS and FBI recruited Lindberg to work against the Soviets in New York and New Jersey because they believed he would be a prime candidate for Soviet recruitment. Lindberg was an active duty military member with a "modest income, impending retirement, and information access" which "made him a perfect candidate to deceive the Soviets into believing he would sell secrets for cash" (FBI 2016). Lindberg communicated with his Soviet handlers via letter, phone calls, and dead drops. Information and money were exchanged through the use of ordinary items such as "magnetic key holders placed in phone booths, cigarette packs, soda cans, orange juice cartons, even a rubber hose from an appliance" (FBI 2016). Additionally, Lindberg provided many of his stolen United States secrets to the Soviets via pre-arranged dead drops that were laid along the New Jersey Turnpike.

The NIS and FBI built their case against the Soviet intelligence officers by having Lindberg pass them notionally classified documents. Although the documents were previously classified at some point, they were declassified at the time of transmission to the Soviets. Ultimately, Lindberg fooled the Soviet intelligence officers into believing they had been given sensitive classified information. Toward the end of the investigation when the NIS and FBI felt they had enough evidence for arrest, they executed one last activity to catch the Soviet intelligence officers in the act.

On 20 May 1978, the NIS and FBI provided Lindberg with "five canisters with actual classified materials" for delivery to the Soviets (FBI 2016). After Lindberg left the five canisters at the dead drop site as instructed by his Soviet handlers, the NIS and FBI were able to make their arrests. Shortly after Lindberg departed the site, the NIS and FBI arrested "Valdik Enger and Rudolf Chernyayev" at the scene when they attempted to retrieve the material (FBI 2016). Another Soviet, by the name of "Vladimir Zinyakin," was also at the scene, but "had diplomatic immunity and was later expelled" from the United States (FBI 2016).

U.S. NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE STRATEGY

The 2016 United States National Counterintelligence Strategy is a document that "sets forth a coordinated plan to detect, deter, and disrupt foreign threats by strengthening bonds and information sharing among government, academic institutions, and the private sector" (ODNI 2016). The 2016 strategy implemented changes based upon the analysis of historic events to increase counterintelligence effectiveness in thwarting foreign intelligence entities efforts to steal United States national security information. Analysis of the efforts, challenges, and ultimate results of Operations Bodyguard and Lemon-Aid likely influenced the development of the current 2016 U.S. National Security Counterintelligence Strategy in the following ways.

Enabling Objective One of the counterintelligence strategy is to "strengthen secure collaboration, responsible information sharing and safeguarding, and effective partnerships" (ODNI 2016). Operations Bodyguard and Lemon-Aid both involved two or more agencies in which the FBI needed to coordinate and work with. During Operation Bodyguard, although the FBI controlled the asset and a means for communication with the Nazis, they required effective communication and coordination with military deception authorities in order to execute their mission. Additionally, during Operation Lemon-Aid, the FBI again required communication and coordination with the NIS in order to provide the notional secret military documents their double agent asset provided to the Soviet intelligence officers. Without collaboration, information sharing, and effective partnerships, both operations would have ultimately failed.

Mission Objective Two of the counterintelligence strategy is to "disrupt foreign intelligence entities' capabilities, plans, and operations that threaten U.S. national interests and sensitive information and assets" (ODNI 2016). In both of the operations discussed, foreign intelligence entities were on United States soil and actively engaged in activities to disrupt United States plans, policies, and undermine United States national interests. The actions taken by the FBI and NIS successfully responded to the threats and likely reinforced the need for continued operations of the same objective.

CONCLUSION

Although the intent of counterintelligence has not significantly changed over the past century, the strategy and methods behind how counterintelligence is accomplished have evolved drastically. At the macro level, World War II and the Cold War significantly influenced how the United States currently conducts counterintelligence in the modern age. Operations Bodyguard and Lemon-Aid are simply two of the many operations conducted by the United States Intelligence Community throughout history to detect, deter, deceive, and neutralize foreign intelligence efforts. Defensively and offensively countering foreign intelligence efforts will continue as a core function of the United States Government, and will continue to evolve.

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