Case $34\mathrm{.}1$ Caterpillar, Inc. v$.$ Sudlow

Court of Appeals of Indiana, $52$ N$.$E$\mathrm{.}3$d $19(2016).$

BACKGROUND AND FACTS The firearms policy at a Caterpillar, Inc., facility in Indiana allowed employees who were legally permitted to possess firearms to store the weapons in their vehicles $$in line with state law.$$ The state firearms statute required firearms stored in vehicles to be locked in a trunk, kept in the glove compartment, or otherwise placed out of sight.

William Sudlow, an employee at Caterpillar, drove to work one day with a loaded Ruger $\mathrm{.}357$ Magnum handgun$$for which he had a permit$$stuffed between the center console and the driver$$s seat. Sudlow left the gun there when he parked and entered the building to begin his workday. Another Caterpillar employee was walking through the parking lot, noticed the handgun in Sudlow$$s vehicle, and reported it to the head of security.

Two days later, Sudlow was fired for violating the company$$s firearms policy. The same day, Caterpillar posted a new firearms policy that explicitly stated that firearms in employees$$ vehicles must be kept $$secured and out of sight.$$ Sudlow filed a complaint in an Indiana state court against Caterpillar, alleging wrongful discharge. The trial court found in Sudlow$$s favor, and a jury awarded him $$85,000$ in damages. Caterpillar appealed, arguing that the public$-$policy exception did not apply to Sudlow$$s firing.

In the Language of the Court

BAKER, Judge.

Here, Caterpillar$$s Firearms Policy did not prohibit conduct that is protected by the $[$Indiana$$s$]$ Firearms Statute. Indeed, Caterpillar could have enacted a more restrictive policy but it chose not to do so$.$ It is readily apparent that neither the Firearms Policy nor Caterpillar$$s interpretation thereof violated the Firearms Statute. As a cause of action under the Firearms Statute is authorized only when an employer violates the statute, Sudlow has no right to recover on this basis. $[$Emphasis added.$]$

If Sudlow does not have a cause of action under the Firearms Statute, his only recourse would be something akin to a wrongful termination claim. It is undisputed that he was an at$-$will employee, meaning that his employment could have been terminated by either party at will, with or without a reason. There are three exceptions to the employment$-$at$-$will doctrine, but the parties discuss only the public policy exception: we have recognized a public policy exception to the employment$-$at$-$will doctrine if a clear statutory expression of a right or duty is contravened $[$violated$].$

The Firearms Statute is the best expression of Indiana$$s public policy regarding the right to transport and store firearms at work. And while this statute does confer a right to store a weapon in a trunk, glove compartment, or out of sight in a locked vehicle, it simply does not confer a right to store a weapon in a vehicle in plain sight. It is apparent, therefore, that in this case, there was no contravention of a clear statutory expression of a right. As a result, the public policy exception to the employment$-$at$-$will doctrine does not apply $[$to Sudlow$$s claim of wrongful discharge$],$ and Sudlow is not entitled to relief under the common law. $[$Emphasis added.$]$

DECISION AND REMEDY The state appellate court found in favor of Caterpillar and reversed and remanded the case to the trial court. Caterpillar had not violated a $$clear statutory expression of a right,$$ because Indiana$$s firearms statute did not grant a right to store a gun in a vehicle in plain sight.

Critical Thinking

Ethical Is the employment$-$at$-$will doctrine fair to employees? Why or why not?