Case Application: Lift-Off: Part 2

NASA was established by the National Aeronautics and Space Act on July 29, 1958. Since that time, it has led U.S. efforts in space exploration including the Apollo lunar landing missions, the Skylab space station, the reusable manned spacecraftwhich we know better as the Space Shuttle. As we stated in the chapter opener, NASA is facing uncertainty over its purpose and budget. Implicitly acknowledging NASAs lack of direction, the White House has instructed the agency to take a deep breath, marshal resources, and chart a new course. Critics complain that the agencys space programs are too slow and too costly. A couple of possibilities being proposed are more international cooperation on space exploration and outsourcing certain tasks to private contractors. Although NASAs managers have important decisions to make about its future, we want to look at some past perfect . . . until 73 seconds into flight when Challenger decisions where the outcomes were anything but what had exploded. During the resulting presidential commission been hoped for. investigation, engineers for Morton Thiokol, the contractor

In an organization like NASA where equipment costs for NASAs failed rocket boosters, revealed that they had millions of dollars and where peoples lives can be at stake, issued repeated warnings about launching in the bitterly cold consistently making good decisions is not only expected, its conditions. They strongly believed that the joint design of the imperative. Over the years, NASA has had many successful solid rocket booster seals was unsafe in those types of condiendeavors. Getting men on the moon, not once, but six times, tions. Furthermore, with management approval, the Morton reflects outstanding technological prowess, far superior to any Thiokol engineers had officially recommended against other country. Putting a rocket into space with a shuttle that launching. When NASAs team refused to accept the conserthen comes back to earth and lands on its own is a reflection of vative unsafe to fly recommendation, Thiokols managers the incredible talent base that NASA has. Despite those overruled the concerns of the engineers and reversed the successes, however, NASA has also had some spectacular earlier decision, giving NASA the green light to launch. Why disasters, which can be traced to errors in the decision-making did NASA officials not pass the Thiokol concerns to those process. higher up in the launch decision chain of command?

Ever winter NASA revisits a week of tragedy during Virtually all of them said that they responded identically which the nation lost 17 astronauts and three space flight because ultimately all parties were in agreement that no vehiclesApollo I in 1967, space shuttle Challenger in 1986, launch commit criteria were violated, and proper and space shuttle Columbia in 2003. We are naturally drawn to procedures were followed. As one Thiokol engineer later ask why these accidents occurredespecially at such an related, There was no miscommunication that night. We accomplished organization working at the cutting edge of clearly told NASA it would be unsafe to launch, but they technology and explorationand whether they could have wouldnt listen to us. been prevented. For space shuttle Columbia, a problem during launch

The events leading up to the tragic end of the damage sustained when a piece of foam insulation the size of Challenger have been studied by many different people from a small briefcase broke off from the external tank and many different perspectivestechnological failures, poor damaged the shuttles thermal protection system on its left decision-making practices, organizational culture, and so wingled to its demise on return. NASAs original shuttle forth. That fateful launch day, January 28, 1986, was a sunny, specifications said that any debris (including foam) were but bitterly cold day in Florida. And the launch was safety issues that needed to be resolved before a launch was cleared. However, over the years, launches were often given the go-ahead as engineers came to see that foam shedding and debris strikes were inevitable and unresolvable. Most shuttle launches have had such foam or debris strikes on the thermal tiles. And NASAs senior managers saw fit to overlook that risk, as it did at Columbias launch. However, on February 1, 2003, as Columbia was on its return from its space mission, heat build-up destroyed the shuttles wing structure and it disintegrated over Texas and Louisiana resulting in the deaths of all seven crew members. The investigative report concluded that the beleaguered space agency, battling a declining budget, learned little from the 1986 Challenger explosion, which also killed seven astronauts, and that a sense of infallibility permeated its decision making. One investigator also wrote, NASA had conflicting goals of cost, schedule, and safety. Unfortunately, safety lost out.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. In doing what the agency is in business to do, do you think NASA managers deal more with structured or unstructured problems? Explain.
2. Would NASAs decision-making conditions be considered certainty, risk, or uncertainty? Explain.
3. What evidences of groupthink and escalation of commitment do you see in the preceding story? How could these decision-making problems have been prevented? What could other organizations learn from NASAs decision-making mistakes?
4. How could NASA managers best utilize the decision-making process as they shape its post-shuttle future?
5. How might international cooperative space efforts and outsourcing certain tasks to private contractors affect the decision making done at NASA?