Case Question: 1. Do you agree with the court's decision? 2. Why would Menoken proceed with this case without having substantive evidence to prove her claim? 3. Is there an ethical resolution to this case? No. 18-5284 09-15-2020 Cassandra M. MENOKEN, Appellant v. Janet DHILLON, Appellee Cassandra M. Menoken, pro se, argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant. Johnny H. Walker, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Jessie K. Liu, U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney. Matthew M. Collette, Washington, DC, and R. Craig Kitchen were on the brief for amicus curiae R. Craig Kitchen in support of appellant. Rao, Circuit Judge Cassandra M. Menoken, pro se, argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant. Johnny H. Walker, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Jessie K. Liu, U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney. Matthew M. Collette, Washington, DC, and R. Craig Kitchen were on the brief for amicus curiae R. Craig Kitchen in support of appellant. Before: Millett, Wilkins, and Rao, Circuit Judges. Rao, Circuit Judge: Cassandra Menoken worked as an attorney for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") from 1982 until 2019. In 2016, Menoken filed a lawsuit against the EEOC alleging that the agencyin its capacity as her employerhad subjected her to a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. , and had violated her rights under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq. The district court dismissed Menoken's complaint in its entirety for failure to state a claim and subsequently denied her motion for reconsideration. We find that the district court erred in dismissing Menoken's retaliatory hostile work environment claim under Title VII, as well as her interference and reasonable accommodation claims under the Rehabilitation Act. We therefore reverse and remand these claims to the district court. Because we conclude the district court properly dismissed Menoken's confidentiality and medical inquiries claims, we affirm that part of the district court's order. I. Menoken's primary claim was that the EEOC violated Title VII by engaging in a multi-year pattern of harassment and hostility in retaliation for her filing various anti-discrimination and retaliation claims against the Office of Personnel Management ("OPM"), the Social Security Administration, and the Department of Health and Human Services beginning in 1994. Menoken alleged that the EEOC's persistently hostile behavior caused her to experience and seek medical treatment for "depression, acute stress, severe hypertension and complex post-traumatic stress disorder." Am. Compl. 21. As a result of these medical conditions, Menoken sought a reasonable accommodation from the EEOC under the Rehabilitation Act, which requires that federal employers such as the EEOC accommodate individuals with disabilities under the same standards as the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. 12111 et seq. The EEOC denied Menoken's request for a reasonable accommodation. In her complaint, Menoken raised four separate claims under the Rehabilitation Act: First , the EEOC unlawfully denied her request for a reasonable accommodation for a known disability ("the reasonable accommodation claim"); second , the EEOC violated the Act's restrictions on conducting inquiries into an employee's medical condition ("the medical inquiries claim"); third , the EEOC violated the Act's confidentiality requirements for employee medical records ("the confidentiality claim"); and fourth , the EEOC unlawfully interfered with Menoken's attempt to exercise rights protected under the Act ("the interference claim"). The EEOC moved to dismiss Menoken's complaint or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The district court dismissed the complaint in its entirety for failure to state a claim. See Menoken v. Lipnic , 300 F. Supp. 3d 175, 190 (D.D.C. 2018). The court allowed for refiling of the Title VII claim but dismissed the Rehabilitation Act claims with prejudice because each suffered from deficiencies that could not be cured through amendment. Id. at 18590. Menoken then filed a motion for reconsideration of the Rehabilitation Act claims, which the district court denied. Menoken v. Lipnic , 318 F. Supp. 3d 239, 241 (D.D.C. 2018) (" Reconsideration Decision "). Among other things, Menoken challenged the district court's holding that there is no cognizable claim for "interference" under the Rehabilitation Act separate and apart from a claim for reasonable accommodation. In its decision denying the motion, the court acknowledged the relevant statutory language of the Act prohibiting unlawful interference, but concluded that this section was treated as a retaliation provision and that Menoken had failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Id. at 24445. This timely appeal followed. Following oral argument, the court ordered supplemental briefing on (1) the proper legal standard for an interference claim under 42 U.S.C. 12203(b), and (2) whether the amended complaint stated a claim for interference under the proper standard. Because Menoken was proceeding pro se, we appointed R. Craig Kitchen as amicus curiae to present arguments in support of Menoken. He has ably discharged those responsibilities. II. On appeal, Menoken challenges both the district court's dismissal of the Title VII and Rehabilitation Act claims alleged in her complaint and its denial of her motion for reconsideration of the Rehabilitation Act claims. We review de novo the district court's dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), "accept[ing] as true all of the complaint's factual allegations and draw[ing] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff[ ]." Owens v. BNP Paribas, S.A. , 897 F.3d 266, 272 (D.C. Cir. 2018). As a general rule, we review a district court's denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion; however, because the district court's reconsideration decision relied on a different legal theory to dismiss Menoken's interference claim under the Rehabilitation Act, we review that claim de novo. See Dyson v. District of Columbia , 710 F.3d 415, 41920 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Applying these standards, we consider each of Menoken's claims in turn.

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