CASE STUDY

Formalization, Structuring, Complexity and Politics

The Six-Day War of June 5-10, 1967 was a war between Israel and an alliance of its neighboring states comprising Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. The Arab states of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria also contributed troops and arms. At the war's end, Israel had gained control of the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights; in short, it was a complete disaster for the Alliance partners and the whole Arab world in general. All this, despite the fact that the Arab Alliance had numerical superiority in all areas, soldiers, ammunition, tanks, air crafts etc. In terms of the quality of arms and ammunition, it enjoyed superiority in few aspects, while parity in others; in no single area of armory were its armies inferior to the Israeli forces, thanks to vital support by the USSR.

What then, was the key behind Israel's remarkable success? Let us probe and see if at least some, if not all, the answers can be found within the structural dimensions of the two competing armies.

Training:

James Reston, writing in the New York Times on 23 May 1967, noted, "In discipline, training, morale, equipment and general competence his [Nasser's*] army and the other Arab forces...., are no match for the Israelis..."

While Israel always maintained a high priority for carrying out exercises and even off-battle training of its troops, which resulted in bringing new, innovative practices inside its fold, the Arab armies always relied more on the status quo procedures for achieving operational effectiveness.

Selection:

Selection to key positions in all Arab armies is, and has always been, a matter of choosing the person based on his perceived loyalty to the regime in power rather than professional competency. This invariably resulted in encouragement of mediocrity for incumbents at key positions, stilting the impact of charismatic characters who, more often than not, were seen as threats to principal power wielders. This mode of thinking has always negatively affected morale down the ranks.

Command & Control Structure:

At this point it is also important to understand the structure of the Israeli Army. Called the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), it was not really an army in the conventional sense of the term, but designed more like a paramilitary force. This, however, should not be taken to mean that it lacked anywhere in terms of professional excellence and competency.

The IDF was more than a mere fighting force; it was an ethos. Underlining it were deeply held notions of volunteerism, of officers leading their men into battle (with the cry Aharai -"After me!"), and social responsibility. In addition to the regular soldiers, for civilians, women were required to serve eighteen months of regular duty, and men at least two years, followed by weeks of annual reserve training till the age of 52. This turned Israeli civilians akin to permanent soldiers on temporary leave.

Highly informal - saluting and marching were rare - the IDF placed its emphasis on speed, improvisation, and a flexibility of command in which even junior officers could make on-the-spot, far-reaching decisions. The assumption was always that Israel would have no choice but to fight a war of its survival, as it had done before, being surrounded by hostile countries all along its border.

In direct contrast to the IDF were the Arab armies. Bureaucratic to the bone, they relied on centralized command where the GOC's or OIC's had little or no discretion while taking decisions on the battle field. They were instructed to seek orders from the GHQ before taking any major decision, which often resulted in a number of vital delays even after their forces had seized the initiative: a phenomenon seen in the Six Day War as well. In some cases, even retreat, a decision designed to cut losses in most cases, was delayed at great expense for want of authorization by the GHQ.

Added to all this was the lack of mutual coordination between the armies of the three countries concerned: Egypt, Syria and Jordan. This was partly a result of mistrust between the leadership of the three countries for each other, and partly a matter of simple ineffective communication as, throughout the period of crisis leading to the war and right up to the start of hostilities, the Alliance failed to set up a joint command center for issuing vital communiqus. In effect, the three armies forming the Alliance fought like three separate armies rather than one outfit.

QUESTIONS:

1. Compare and contrast the elements of centralization and formalization within the Arab Alliance and the IDF. Explain how those inherent differences may have affected the outcome of the war and do you think the element of complexity was higher in Arab Alliance? (App 150 words)

---------------

------------------------------------------------------------

---------------

------------------------------------------------------------