Case study

From its very start, Google has embraced the idea of innovation actively. The founders began their company with the (at the time) totally innovative concept of an online search engine. Then the instituted the 20 percent rule, according to which all employees had to spend at least one workday per week on creative, off-the-wall project ideas. With such a foundation, Googles record of innovation is naturally impressive, from Google Maps to Street view to driverless cars, from the Android operating system to Chromebooks. And then came Google Glass. Even before the wearable technology was introduced in any form, it seemed as if everyone knew what it was- and had an opinion about its efficacy, appeal, and look. The wearable product would allow users to surf the Internet and gather information simply by looking up and to the right. They could swipe their fingers over a sensor behind their ears to pull up a Google map and navigate, take pictures, or initiate the embedded Bluetooth technology to make a call.⁶⁶ The initial rollout of Google Glass was limited, purposefully, by a couple of factors. First, Google set the price very high, at around$1,500. That meant that only the most dedicated tech geeks, and those with plenty of disposable income, would be the ones first sporting the headband-like devices. Second, Google required people to register for the chance to receive a set.⁶⁷ Even if thousands wanted to spend the money, Google allowed only a select few to receive them at any one time. The slow, measured rollout was designed to provide several benefits for Google. Because it sought to minimize the supply available, Google created a perception that Glass was extremely popular and stirred up excitement in potential customers. The press buzz and word of mouth spread remarkably far and quickly. Furthermore, it identified a readymade segment of beta testers. By making sure that those who used the early versions of Google Glass were really interested in it, Google knew that the feedback they provided was more likely to be insightful and related to the underlying technology. Thus it did not have to filter out, initially, complaints about it being too hard to use from people without much technological savvy or other review that seemed less important to the developers.

But the results were not exactly as Google planned. Google assumed most comments would be about technology improvements. Instead, much of the information it gleaned involved the look of the device and the alternative uses it could support. For example, though there was never any danger that Google Glass would become a high-fashion option, people sought to make them at least a little more attractive. The solution was an easy one: offer Google Glass in several colors, so that fashionable folks could coordinate with their phones, purses, or favorite hues.

In terms of the functions for which people actually use Google Glass, the innovators predictions again were inaccurate. Google anticipated that Glass would resonate most with busy business professionals who found the act of taking their smartphones out of their pockets too inefficient. But it learned quickly that even these professional segments used Glass in far more casual manners. In one example, a pet lover explained that it was far easier to take funny cat videos when both hands were fee to tempt the feline with a toy.⁶⁸

Along with this feedback, Google noted some surprise at the diversity of people interested in Glass. As Leila Takayama, a researcher with Google, explained, We were expecting the people to be extremely tech savvy-to kind of look like us Googles. But what we actually saw were people who were much more diverse. They were people who were just sort of curious.⁶⁹ Although diversity of users seemingly should have been a benefit, instead it meant that Google Glass was not satisfying any market segments needs precisely. Casual users found it ugly and awkward; high-tech early adopters complained about its short battery life and expressed their disgust with the terrible product online, noting that it was plagued by defects, bus, and poor performance. In the wake of this negative press, Google pulled Glass nearly completely from the world. Not only did it stop producing new versions of the product, but it also removed dedicated social media pages on Facebook and Twitter, as if to pretend the launch had never happened. In so doing, it prompted many observers to proclaim the death of Google Glass.⁷⁰ but not so fast. Post-mortem accounts suggest that the tremendous buzz and highly touted launch of the product-those marketing techniques that seemingly promised its success-actually were exactly what Google Glass engineers had hoped to avoid.⁷¹ The research and development team knew that the initial product had lots of bugs; they never intended it to be released for widespread use. Instead, they called for a slow, quiet rollout, in which selected users would beta test the prototypes and provide specific feedback and information that would enable Google to create a more functional product for the wider market. Somewhere along the line though, the quiet rollout transformed into a media blitz, and the expectations for Google Glass rose well above any potential benefits that it was even designed to offer at that point in its life cycle. Today, Google has basically no official comment to offer about the future of Google Glass. But a dedicated team still exists at Google,⁷² overseen by two managers: a former jewelry designer and a former Apple product developer, These hires suggest that Google might be focusing more on the design appeal of potential new versions. Moreover, the continued growth of wearable technology-from the Apple Watch to the Fitbit to Samsungs Gear-reinforce the appeal of the underlying concept: Modern users love their personal technology, and they want a viable, effective means to use their personal devices in hands-free, convenient ways. Google thus might emerge as an early entrant and innovator in this market. It also seemingly has broken open the path for other technology firms that look at its example and find inspiration for entering product markets on their own. For example, recent reports suggest that Snapchat has been hiring hardware experts and engineers with vast experience working on other wearable technology projects.⁷³ Does that mean Snap Glass might be the next new thing on the market?

Problems

1. What kind of testing did Google perform for Google Glass? What other methods might it have used?
2. At what stages of its product life cycle is Google Glass today?
3. What can later entrants into the wearable technology market learn from Google's new product introduction?

please I need 1-3 answers (particularly number 1) including all sources

Thank you