CHAPTER 3. Planning and Strategic Management 91. CHAPTER CLOSING CASE specific I need to do or tweak?" chaos." One Louisiana state official (Amid controversy and shock, Brown commented, "If you do not know resigned on September 12.) what your needs are, you can't Yet lack of planning was, sur- request to FEMA what you need." What can be done to help FEMA's disastrously inadequate authorities respond more effectively? response. The agency was well One scholar attributes the problems aware of the possibility of a Katrina- to a failure of imagination. Dr. Lee Clarke, a Rutgers University pro . staged "Hurricane Pam," a disaster fessor, claims planners neglected simulation focused on New Orleans. to consider worst-case scenarios. "The usual or recommended way The exercise hypothesized mass evacuations and levee destruction. In of looking at risk... is probabilistic FEMA'S DISASTROUS RESPONSE TO MURRICANE KATRINA A $150 billion estimated cost of recovery, 2.5 million persons dis- placed from their homes, 1,100 deaths, thousands hospitalized, and, as of January 2006, 3,600 individuals prisingly, not one of the causes of still missing. U.S. annual GDP may drop 1 percent, reflecting the $130 billion in annual contributions made by the region. Over 100,000 jobs lost like disaster. In July 2004, FEMA in two months in Louisiana alone. A quarter of a million of homes destroyed. An estimated 372,000 elementary and secondary students without schools and eleven universi- 2005, Brown's superior, Director of thinking," says Clarke. "Probability ties temporarily closed Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, says it is highly unlikely that a The force of a Category 5 hur- introduced a National Preparedness nuclear power plant will malt down. ricane is one of the most destructive Plan. The plan included scenario- Possibilism wonders what happens if natural events. Hurricane Katrina, based planning for 15 disaster sce- a nuclear power plant has a particu- --Hich hit the Gulf Coast on August narios, including a flu pandemic, larly bad day.... [lt] is worst case 29, 2005, was the costliest natural major earthquake, and terrorist thinking." Clarke's theory would call disaster in American history and led attack-and a major hurricane. for emergency responders to plan for to vast human cuffering. Yet human Although the possible extent of worst-case, as well as most-likely- errors were responsible for much of the damage was known, as was the case, scenarios. the economic, physical, and emo- responsibility for various actions, Another approach would focus tional damage, as many individuals, there was a lack of clear communi- on grass-roots planning efforts. organizations, and governmental cation and a failure to coordinate the During Katrina, for example, many bodies failed to respond appropri- actions of different organizations and groups and individuals took heroic ately. Blame has been placed on eve- governments. Although Governor actions to help victims. The U.S. ryone from the citizens to President Blanco asked FEMA for aid and New Coast Guard, helped by hundreds of Bush, but none has received more Orleans ordered evacuation, FEMA privately owned watercraft, rescued blame than the Federal Emergency failed to provide the necessary sup- 22.000 stranded individuals, more Management Agency, or FEMA. port. The U.S. Army was prepared to than the USCG rescued in the previ- One factor in the fiasco is FEMA drop food and water via helicopter ous half century. Businesses donated chief Michael Brown's lack of lead- millions and families opened their as early as August 30 but was never asked to do so. Yet city and state homes to victims. In this approach. officials claim their organizations planning for future Katrinas could impress television viewers and whin. were overwhelmed and unable to be improved by building on local ing to his deputy director , "Can I quit request the help. One Businessweek knowledge and resources. The proc- editor sums up the situation, say- ess should include those who are not ing, "There is no clear strategy for included in the current system, such dealing with extraordinary disaster as the disabled, the elderly, and indi- scenarios that can easily overwhelm viduals without transportation. local officials. And the lack of such Anderson Cooper, a CNN cor- unambiguous procedures can lead to respondent, reflected that the lesson ership. His emails of August 29 discuss rolling up his shirtsleeves to now? Can I go home?" An employee emailed him on August 31, saying New Orleans was "past critical" and mentioning deaths and water shortages. Brown wrote back only: "Thanks for the update. Anything PART TWO. Planning learned in Katrina is, "we are not would be the advantages of each as ready as we can be." Whatever approach? it takes, we need to improve our 3. How would worst-case plan- planning processes and be ready. ning have helped emergency because there will surely be a next responders react more effec- time. For, as Stanford professor Scott tively to Hurricane Katrina? Sagan says, "Things that have never happened before happen all the CASE REFERENCES time." "Brown Defends FEMA Response, Fox News, September 28, 2005, www.foxnews. CASE QUESTIONS com on January 15, 2006; "Can I Quit Now?' FEMA Chief Wrote as Katrina 1. In your opinion, were the prob- Raged," CNN, November 3, 2005, www. lems experienced by agencies cnn.com on January 15, 2006; Lee Clarke, coping with Hurricane Katrina "Worst Case Katrina," Understanding occurring at the strategic, tacti- Katrina: Perspectives from the Social cal, or operational level? Explain. Sciences , September 12, 2005, The Social Sciences Research Council website, www. 2. Should FEMA handle planning SSTc.org on January 15, 2006; "FEMA for hurricanes and other natu- Director Brown Resigns," CNN, September ral disasters with a single-use 12, 2005, www.cnn.com on January 15, 2006; "If Katrina Teaches Us Nothing plan or a standing plan? What Else... Business Week, October 10, 2005, www.businessweek.com on January 15, 2006; "Labor Market Statistics for Areas Affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita," Bureau of Labor Statistics, www.bls.gov on January 15, 2006; Andrew Lakoff, "From Disaster to Catastrophe: The Limits of Preparedness," Understanding Katrina: Perspectives from the Social Sciences, September 30, 2005, The Social Sciences Research Council website, www.ssc.org on January 15, 2006; "Reported Locations of Katrina/Rita Applicants," January 20, 2006, FEMA website www.fema.gov on January 22, 2006; Tricia Wachtendorf and James M. Kendra, "Improvising Disaster in the City of Jazz: Organizational Response to Hurricane Katrina," Understanding Katrina: Perspectives from the Social Sciences, September 21, 2005, The Social Sciences Research Council website, www. sstc.org on January 15, 2006