Question: Consider a 3-period sequential (alternating) bar- gaining model where two players have to split a pie worth 1 (starting with player 1 making the offer).
Consider a 3-period sequential (alternating) bar- gaining model where two players have to split a pie worth 1 (starting with player 1 making the offer). Now the players have different discount factors, δ1 and δ2.
(a) Compute the outcome of the unique subgame perfect equilibrium. (b) Show that when δ1 = δ2 then player 1 has an advantage.
(c) What conditions on δ1,δ2 give player 2 an advantage? Why?
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